In March 2009, LRA Col Thomas Kwoyelo was captured in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He was flown to Uganda for treatment under detention. Kwoyelo’s trial officially kicked-off on Monday 11 July 2011 in Gulu, the district most affected by the conflict in northern Uganda. A visibly frightened Kwoyelo was arraigned in a fully packed Gulu High Court session, before a full bench – a panel of three judges of the International Crimes Division (ICD), formerly the War Crimes Division.

From left to right: Justice Nahamya, Justice Akiiza, Justice Owiny-Dollo

The trial day began with an official opening of the High Court session, a guard of honour and a full parade which attracted a wide range of stakeholders, including victims, local communities, civil society, government representatives and international participants. Kwoyelo pleaded not-guilty to all the 12 counts and 53 alternative charges read to him, one after the other, by the Hon. Justice Dan Akiki Kiiza, Head of the ICD.

Many of the victims and the affected population within northern Uganda expressed mixed feelings about the trial. Some celebrated the day as a leap in their search for justice, sustainable peace and reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. However, many affected by LRA attacks agonised that the trial alone would not fulfil their sense of justice. They called for more robust measures to be taken to complement the prosecutions of perpetrators. For instance, Hon. Jane Akwero Odwong, a gender justice activist, challenged the court to adopt measures to address sexual and gender based violence meted out during the conflict.

Yet the LRA continues to attack civilians and displace populations within neighbouring countries such as the DRC and parts of the Central African Republic and Sudan. Many believe that although Kwoyelo is a footnote in the ranks of key perpetrators who bear the greatest responsibility for their suffering, his trial is nonetheless considered long overdue – justice delayed is justice denied. It is the hope of many people that Kwoyelo will be given a fair hearing to demonstrate this country’s commitment to due process and the rule of law.

The ICD courtroom was fully packed

Many victims also expect a full implementation of the entire agreement on accountability and reconciliation reached during the peace talks in Juba. These would including the implementation of traditional justice mechanisms such as Mato Oput, reparations, truth seeking and accountability by both state and non-state actors who committed atrocities during the insurgency. During a stakeholders meeting held at the Gulu High Court just before the trial, participants questioned the courts’ commitment to comprehensive justice, accountability by state actors such as the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) – which is alleged to have committed atrocities – issues of reparation, witness protection, gender justice and traditional justice processes for sustainable peace and the search for national unity.

The head of the ICD Hon. Justice Dan Akiki Kiiza promised the courts impartiality and commitment to hear all cases brought to court by the prosecutor. He urged the government and the stakeholders present to explore the implementation of the other mechanisms for comprehensive solutions. He said, however, that the judiciary is not responsible for investigating and bringing charges against different actors, including the UPDF – that is the mandate of the Directorate of Public Prosecution (DPP).

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Personally I believe that dialogue is the best way to end LRA hostilities and restore stability in LRA affected areas of the DRC, Southern Sudan and the Central African Republic. Past peace initiatives between the LRA and the Government of Uganda (GoU) paid more dividends than military operations, and even if such attempts failed to find a complete end to the insurgency, no single party can be entirely blamed for the failures. Is this the time to pick up the pieces and begin the needed first step in a long difficult journey to end the LRA conflict?

Background on the LRA

The Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) insurgency has been ongoing for close to 24 years. This armed conflict initially started as a northern Ugandan popular local uprising against a perceived aggressive and revengeful victorious National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M). The rebels, and some government forces, due to their lack of civilian support, then turned their guns on innocent civilians. Many civilians were uprooted from their homes and dumped in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, known as “protected villages”. Since the mid-1990s and without local civilian support, the LRA has resorted to mass abduction and killings to replenish its quickly diminishing forces. Apart from occasional logistical support from the Khartoum government, and sanctuary in southern Sudan and now the jungles of the DR Congo, it is difficult to explain how the LRA movement led by Joseph Kony managed to survive for all these years and export its atrocities throughout the region. According to the Refugee Law Project, “at first glance, the persistence of the LRA over such a long period is incomprehensible: the majority of the force is made up of kidnapped children held against their will: the LRA is extremely unpopular among civilians because of its brutality and apparent lack of an overarching political agenda, and it operates in an environment without significant natural resources to sell for arms”.  Today it is 24 years and counting, with atrocities in Southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR).

Past Attempts at Peace with the LRA

Since 1987, various attempts have been made to end the insurgency in northern Uganda, ranging from military strikes and operations, the offer of general amnesty, dialogue and negotiations. Ugandans witnessed military offensives like ‘Operation North’ (1991), ‘Operation Iron Fist I and II’ (2002 –2004/05), International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments and arrest warrants and ‘Operation Lightening Thunder’ (2008-2010). Several peace initiatives led by religious and cultural leaders, as well as national and international mediation efforts have failed. The latest examples were the Juba Peace Talks (2006-2008) and the Uganda, Sudan and Congo joint military attack ‘Operation Lightening Thunder’ (2008-2010), both described as unprecedented attempts to end the LRA insurgency.

The Juba talks had all the agenda items (Cessations of Hostilities – CoH; Comprehensive Solutions to the Conflict – CSC; Accountability and Reconciliation – AAR; Permanent Cease Fire – PCF; and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration – DDR) signed. It ushered in over five years of relative peace (2006-2010), although a Final Peace Agreement (FPA) was never signed. In 2008 and for the first time, the LRA came under a joint military attack involving four different countries in the region with support from the United States of America. However, the LRA eluded these attempts, left northern Uganda and instead established new frontiers, intensifying their atrocities in Southern Sudan, the eastern part of  the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR).

New Developments in the Peace Process

A lot has changed since then. A major obstacle during the Juba peace talks was the issue of ICC indictments. Despite several requests from the Ugandan government and civil society that the ICC suspend its warrants to help with the peace talks, ICC claimed Uganda must demonstrate its capacity to address crimes committed by the LRA. First it’s not only the LRA who committed crimes in northern Uganda and which must be dealt with in any credible justice pursuit. Second, Uganda has since adopted and domesticated the ICC Act and established a Special War Crimes Division (WCD) pursuant to the Agreement reached with the LRA in Juba in 2007. Also the ICC is coming under increasing fire from the African Union (AU) for its lack of acknowledgment and recognition of the dilemma of pursuing punitive justice in a conflict situation like the LRA.

These developments mean that if the LRA proposals are genuine they should be welcomed. There are now possibilities for dealing with some of the obstacles that frustrated the Juba Talks. The Juba talks ushered in a peace that had eluded northern Uganda for 20 years. The Obama administration passed an LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act which prioritises civilian protection and peaceful or forceful resolution of the conflict. Operation Lightening Thunder failed miserably in protecting civilian lives and despite the success it achieved, thousands of innocent civilians became victims. The LRA Disarmament Act calls for a regional and comprehensive solution to the LRA conflict and this provides an unprecedented opportunity to once again re-engage with the LRA for a regional solution. However, it’s coming to election year in Uganda and politicians are busy plotting on how to rig or unleash violence to win elections. Which means the LRA issue will be overlooked as a distance threat. Yet in fact, the LRA, even though they are now operating in DRC, CAR or Southern Sudan should remain Uganda’s problems just like when they were in northern Uganda.

Should we then wait for elections before we resume any peace talks? The answer might be yes and no. ‘Yes’, given the lack of attention and possible changes in personality in the political change, but also ‘no’ because the LRA is a national, if not a regional problem, and what happens in Uganda’s political scene should not postpone its urgency. The army continues to fight despite ongoing elections and so much dialogue continues. It’s important to recognise the futility of military victory in ending the LRA insurgency comprehensively and addressing its root causes and reasons for continuity. A peaceful settlement on the other hand is cheaper and will help heal the deepening division created by this unending conflict. Will the AU add to the UN Security council a request for suspension of arrest warrants against LRA leaders if they resume credible peace talks like they did for President Bashir of Sudan? Will the ICC listen to the cries of victims of ongoing LRA violence in DRC, CAR and southern Sudan and pave the way for ending the conflict? Is the government of President Museveni ready to once more extent a genuine olive branch to the LRA?

These and many more are issues that must be addressed in renewed talks between the LRA and government of Uganda. The attack that followed the Juba peace talks undermined any little trust that could have existed between the LRA and President Museveni and his government and in any case there is need for an independent guarantor of any peace process. There next rounds of peace talks will be long and must also include direct and face to face meetings between LRA leader Joseph Kony and the President of Uganda.

Stephen Oola, Uganda Local Correspondent, 17 September 2010

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[1] For more information on this period, I recommend the following paper by the Refugee Law Project: ” Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda”. Working Paper No.11.2004

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Posted by Ruairi Nolan, Insight on Conflict, 11 January 2010

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