image by United States Marine Corps, published under the Creative Commons License.

The Rise and Fall of Communism and the Soviet War

In 1978 the Saur Revolution overthrew the existing government and implemented a Socialist agenda.  Led by Mohammed Daud Khan, the agenda included a move to state atheism, land reforms and declared the equality of the sexes. However, many members of the traditional elite, the religious establishment and the intelligentsia were imprisoned, tortured or killed. The Mujahedeen, loosely-aligned opposition forces made up of groups of mostly Pashtun tribesmen, began attacks aimed at overthrowing the Marxist-Leninist government, which was also under attack from separate attacks from other left-wing groups who disagreed with Daud Khan. The ruling party in turn requested the support of the Soviet Union in fighting the Mujahedeen resistance, removing the other left-wing opposition and supporting the failing Afghan army. There was an initial, massive deployment of 100,000 Red Army troops into Afghanistan. The US saw this as a prime opportunity to weaken the Soviet Union as part of its Cold War strategy, and they began to provide training and arms to the Mujahedeen resistance groups, along with extra support from other countries such as Saudi Arabia (who had their own agenda) and the UK.

There are many varied reports that the financial and military assistance from these external powers ranged from $10 to $40 billion over the nine-year conflict.  It officially ended in 1989 with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces.  The devastation caused by the conflict left an estimated two million people dead and 1.5 million people disabled, in part due to the massive city carpet-bombing campaigns and the large areas of land mines that still exist today. One third of the country’s pre-war population also fled into neighbouring Pakistan, Iran and further afield, and two million people were internally displaced.

image by US Army, published under the Creative Commons License

By 1992 the Communist government had collapsed and the Peshawar Accord declared Afghanistan to be the Islamic State of Afghanistan.  However, many groups refused to acknowledge the new government and the country soon fell into civil war that lasted throughout the 1990s.  Working government departments, the police, justice systems and education systems did not have time to reform after the Soviet War and much of the country descended into lawlessness.  This led to areas being controlled by different armed factions who in turn were supported by governments and groups in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and the US.

In the early 1990s in Kandahar, a militia group called the Taliban, began to emerge as a political and religious force, led by Mohammed Omar and with the support of many Afghan refugees from Pakistan, and who supposedly opposed the tyrannical rule of the local governor and began to install greater order into the area. The group gained increasing recognition, power and support and began to take control of much of southern and central Afghanistan.

Implementation of an Islamic state

The Taliban was able to oust the existing, weakened government and take over Kabul in September 1996, establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.  Many of the Taliban’s leaders followed a fundamentalist version of Deobandi and Wahhabi Islam and a strict interpretation of Afghan social and cultural norms.  They enforced the most extreme version of Sharia law ever encountered in the modern Islamic world. The Taliban became notorious internationally for its treatment of women, who had (amongst other things) to wear the burqa (a full face and body covering); were not allowed outside the home without a related male chaperone and were not permitted to work or to be schooled after the age of eight.  In some areas of Afghanistan music, dance and other forms of entertainment were also banned and public beatings and executions occurred for those who disobeyed the laws enforced by their police or anyone seen as a political dissident.  Many Pakistani nationals joined the Taliban to fight against the United Front’s forces and Osama bin Laden channelled more money into the Taliban, citing them as the only true Islamic state.  Bin Laden had been involved in the Soviet War, providing money to different militia groups to fight the Soviet forces.  He returned to Afghanistan in 1996 after having to flee Sudan and Saudi Arabia, and allegedly used the country as a base to plan and finance attacks internationally.

image by Dfid, published under the Creative Commons License

At the same time, the United Front, also known as the Northern Alliance, led by Ahmad Massoud, fought back against the Taliban stronghold.  Western support and financial assistance in the 1990s had dramatically decreased after the end of the Cold War.  But with the increase in the number of attacks on US embassies internationally from Islamist terrorist groups, attention began to increase once again with the US attacking suspected bases belonging to bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1998, along with the UN also ordering increasing sanctions on the Taliban.  Massoud appealed to the European Parliament in early 2001 for help and warned that there was information about a large-scale attack on US soil.  However, he was killed by a suicide bomb attack on 9 September 2001, two days before the attacks on the Twin Towers that shook the world.

September 11^th and the US War of Terror

In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks the US government quickly identified Osama bin Laden as responsible and claimed that the Taliban stronghold was harbouring him and refusing to hand him over. They launched a series of aerial attacks on supposed al-Qaida bases under Taliban control and began militarily and financially supporting the Northern Alliance to bring down the Taliban. The Taliban government in Kabul collapsed by December 2001, with many of the Taliban forces moving to the south and along the contested border with Pakistan.

Hamid Karzai was installed as the President of the interim government in 2001 and other coalition forces joined the US and UK fight against insurgency attacks in Afghanistan, namely France, German and Italy supplying the most troops.  In 2004 the first Presidential elections were held, with Karzi winning 53 per cent of the votes, but with an extremely low voter turnout amid fears of election violence.  However, since 2006 there has been an increase in the levels of insurgency led by the Taliban who used mainly improvised explosives and suicide bomb attacks, a UN report has suggested that most of the civilian casualties in Afghanistan are the result of Taliban attacks.  The coalition military occupation is now in its tenth year, with approximately 154,000 troops currently stationed there, and an estimated 10,000 people were killed in 2010 alone.

image by US Army, published under the Creative Commons License

The Obama administration pushed towards a final troop surge at the end of 2010, with an extra 30,000 US troops. The US has given a date of July 2011 when they want to start withdrawing troops from Afghanistan and to shift control to Afghan security forces by 2014.  However, training of the forces and police has proved extremely difficult with large numbers of suicide bomb attacks at recruitment centres, a drop-out rate of 25 per cent and a high level of drug addiction amongst troops.

Destruction of war

Afghanistan is struggling to rebuild itself amidst the ongoing war despite the billions of dollars of aid that have been pumped into the country. Life expectancy is 44 years, compared to an average of 53 years for other low-income countries worldwide.  The government is failing to extend its control or enter into negotiations with the Taliban, while the Taliban in turn refuse to enter any negotiations until all foreign troops leave the country. Much of the Taliban and its leaders are based across the border in Pakistan, where British and US troops cannot be seen to be overtly attacking or occupying, but have made frequent use of ‘drone’ attacks, which are carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The opium trade has increased massively since 2001 and the occupying forces are unable to prevent it, with some of the proceeds allegedly going to members of the Kazai government.  Other forms of corruption remain rife in all sectors of society and some areas remain outside of government control.

image by Defense Images, published under the Creative Commons License.

In July 2010 Wikileaks released a huge cache of 90,000 secret military files related to Afghanistan.  Revealing how the coalition forces had killed hundreds of civilians in unreported incidents, it also recorded the surge in Taliban attacks and the fear of support to the Taliban from neighbouring Iran and Pakistan.

Throughout spring 2011, the Taliban launched a major offensive, targeting government officials and buildings. The attacks took place in Kandahar with the Taliban claiming to take over the city. This inflamed insurgency,  – fueled by the recent killing of Osama Bin Laden – demonstrates how the Afghan government and Western forces are tilting at windmills of extremists groups, trapping the country in a spiral of violence.

There is no immediate end in sight to the Afghanistan conflict, and its complex issues and lack of stable governance mean that new conflicts will continue to rise up.  However, there is a small but steady increase in the number of groups working towards building civil society on a local level and mediating conflicts. The stance on development in Afghanistan is shifting slightly, with more awareness being given to locally-led projects as opposed to donor-led projects. After more than three decades of conflict the fatigue of war felt by its people is strong, and there is a definite need for a chance of a more tolerable situation in a country where many generations have only known war.

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Afghanistan: Conflict Timeline

Timeline and history of the conflict in Afghanistan from 1919 to the present day.

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Afghanistan: Key People and Parties

A summary of the key people and parties in the conflict in Afghanistan

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Afghanistan: Resources

Links to key resources for further reading on the conflict in Afghanistan.

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Uganda has long been deeply divided along national, religious and ethnic lines. The British rule in Uganda exacerbated and played on these divisions in order to maintain control, but while they had a relatively peaceful move to becoming an independent state in 1962, this peace was not to last.

Photo credit: John & Mel Kots

As Uganda held its first post-independence elections in 1962, Milton Obote of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), became Uganda’s first Prime Minister. The UPC’s main political platform was their opposition to the hegemony of the Southern Kingdom of Buganda, who had been given a preferential position by the British. However, despite this platform, the UPC formed an alliance with the monarchy; but this alliance became increasingly uneasy and unstable.

Obote and Amin: Despotic rulers

By 1967 Obote had changed the constitution and proclaimed Uganda a republic, abolishing the system of traditional Kingdoms, removing the President and declaring himself Executive President. This occurred after Obote was implicated, along with Idi Amin, in an alleged gold and ivory smuggling trade, into which the President, King Mutesa II, had ordered an investigation.  However, with the support of the police and the army (led by Idi Amin). the UPC was able to suppress any political opposition.

In the months which followed, an increasing rift occurred between Obote and Amin, leading to Amin organising a military coup in 1970, in which he easily took over power in the climate of political and economic unrest already in the country.  Obote fled into exile to Tanzania, along with 20,000 other Ugandans.

Amin ruled with mounting control, using violence to terrorise the nation into compliance. He persecuted any group suspected of opposing him, which came to include, amongst others, other ethnic groups, religious leaders, journalists, intellectuals, judges, artists and minority groups. In this atmosphere of violence, many people were killed simply at will or for criminal motives. A suspected 300,000 to 500,000 people were murdered under Amin’s eight-year regime. He further ordered the expulsion of around 80,000 members of Uganda’s Asian community, many of whom ran major industries and businesses in Uganda. These businesses collapsed due to mis-management after he expropriated them to his supporters, crippling the economy and sending it  into freefall.

When Amin attempted to invade Tanzania in 1979, Juluis Nyerere, the Tanzanian President, declared war and counterattacked, along with Obote and  toppled Amin’s now fragile regime.  This led to two interim governments being installed by returning Ugandan exiles. Amin fled to Libya and later to Saudi Arabia, where he remained until his death in 2003.

In 1980, Obote regained power under the UPC in a general election, which was contested by many and considered to be fraudulent. Obote installed a gradually more and more repressive regime, which led to Uganda having one of the worst human-rights records world-wide.  Furthermore, in an effort to control the opposition led by Museveni’s NRA guerrilla group, much of the North of the country was laid to waste and an estimated 100,000 people were killed. However, by 1985 Obote was deposed again and overthrown by his army commanders in another military coup. In the chaos that occurred after this event Museveni was able to seize control of the country. Museveni proclaimed a government of national unity and declared himself President. This was seen as a shift in Ugandan politics, with Museveni introducing some democratic reforms and much improving its human rights record.

image with thanks to 350.org, published under the Creative Commons license.

Museveni, the LRA and Civil Wars

However, since the 1990s Uganda has been involved in a civil war in the North against the Lord’s Resistance Army. Led by Joseph Kobe, who wishes to, allegedly, establish a state based on the biblical Ten Commandments. Kony is accused of carrying out widespread abduction of children to serve as soldiers or sex slaves. It is estimated that the LRA have abducted around 30,000 children and the civil war has led to the displacement of 1.6 million people from Northern Uganda and the deaths, mutilations and kidnappings of more than 100,000 people.

In the 23 years Museveni’s government has been in power, more than 20 other militant groups have attempted to displace the government both within and beyond the Ugandan borders.  The Allied Democratic Front (ADF) operates in the western parts of Uganda, in the districts of Kasese and Bundibunyo, with the bases in the border mountains of Rwenzori in DR Congo, from which they launch occasional attacks on civilians in both countries. The People’s Redemption Army (PRA) is another rebel group operating in parts of DR Congo with alleged links to some opposition parties within Uganda. In the eastern parts of Uganda and the Karamoja region, armed rebellion has ended following a government blanket amnesty to members of the Uganda Democratic Army (UDA) but armed cattle raids and a forceful disarmament programme being conducted by the government forces makes the regions extremely violent and largely inaccessible. The West Nile region had two rebel groups; the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF II) both of whom operated in and out of DR Congo but which ceased hostility following a peace deal with the government in 2001. Furthermore, Uganda has also been involved in a number of diplomatic incidents and armed incursions with their neighbours, most notably Rwanda, Sudan, DR Congo and Somalia.

image by CIAT - International Center for Tropical Agriculture, published under the Creative Commons License

Peace talks were initiated in Juba in 2008 between the LRA and government of Uganda which brought relative stability to the Northern region temporarily, but the LRA now continue with their atrocities. Joseph Kony and others in the LRA leadership have been indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court. They have spread their operations beyond Uganda are now operating in Eastern DR Congo, parts of the Central African Republic, and Sudan.  Kony has refused to sign any peace agreement unless the charges made against him by the ICC are dropped. In December 2008 Uganda, DR Congo and Sudan launched a joint military offensive backed by the US against the LRA, and by the beginning of 2009 the LRA appealed for a ceasefire. However, despite the offensive and the call for a ceasefire, Kony and the rest of the leadership remain elusive after 25 years.

Museveni, who was once a favourite of the international community for his policies on economic growth and HIV/AIDS response, has recently had presidential term limits abolished, leaving many concerned about his commitment to democracy. Additionally, there are questions over corruption and the distribution of natural resources.  However, the February 2011 elections led to the Museveni gaining another term, taking 68 per cent of the vote. The opposition parties have claimed election fraud and asserted that many voters were bribed. This along with the violence led by insurgent groups is leading many in the international community to fear greater violence and instability in the region.

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Uganda: Conflict Resources

Links to key resources for further reading on the conflict in Uganda.

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Uganda: Conflict Timeline

An extensive timeline of the conflict in Uganda. Includes key flashpoints within an historical framework.

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Uganda: Key people and parties

A overview of the key people and parties involved in the conflicts in the Uganda.

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2010 General Elections

In the run up to the 2010 elections in Burundi, Landry Ninteretse finds both cynicism and a determination to reject divisive ethnic politics.

Burundi Bikers Mobilise

Sixteen volunteers from the Amahoro Youth Club lead a peace parade of over 100 bikers across the city of Bujumbura.

Cohabitation and Survival in the Peace Village of Muriza

Report on the severe poverty and health problems affecting the inhabitants of a peace village in Burundi. Residents are former IDPs or refugees in Tanzania.

Elections Fears in Mabanda

With the upcoming elections, tensions are rising in Burundi. Political parties seem to be determined to win elections at all costs. Defamatory remarks, intimidations, bribes and unrealistic promises are used to convince voters.

From Guns to Garages

Landry Ninteretse with the story of how a training programme in mechanics by Maison Shalom is integrating former young combatants in Burundi.

No More War!

Report on independent resolution of land conflicts in Rumonge, Burundi, outside the government National Land and Other Properties Commission (NLOPC) scheme.

The Joys and Pains of Sharing Land in Makamba

The conflict over land in Burundi continues to spread tensions. Tubiyage Association in partnership with UNICEF launched a project for peaceful resolution of land conflicts in Makamba.

From the Editors

Burundi Early Warning Election Project, April 2010
The last couple of years have seen a number of highly impressive developments in the use of mobile phones to monitor conflicts and humanitarian disasters. Now, the African Great Lakes Initiative (AGLI) of the Friends Peace Teams has created the Burundi Early Warning Project to use the mobile platform to collect information and report on upcoming elections in Burundi. In this way, they will be able to identify flashpoints and enable communities to respond to potentially dangerous situations. Given the fears of violence for these elections, this grassroots information could turn out to be invaluable.

Mob violence in Burundi (April 2010).. Human Rights Watch have just released a long (105 pages) report on mob violence, finding that the “authorities have at times been directly involved in public killings and beatings of suspected criminals, or have facilitated them by forming untrained “security committees” that operate at the margins of the law”.

Burundi – ‘Amnesty International submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review’ (December 2008): This report details wide-scale human rights abuses by state and non-state actors in Burundi. Unreported violence against women, torture and ill treatment and misadministration of justice are amongst the main themes in this report. ‘Between 2004 and 2006, an average of 1,346 women a year reported their cases…(of rape)… to Médecins sans Frontières (MSF).  Minors are also particularly at risk: in December 2006, 60 percent of reported rapes were committed against minors. The Burundian authorities are failing to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish rape and other sexual violence, and the perpetrators often escape prosecution and punishment by the state.’

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Southern-based militant groups function within a fluid and dynamic system. Broadly speaking they share similar objectives – an independent or relatively autonomous status for Pattani – however they differ widely in their approaches and capabilities. Whilst many tens of splinter groups exist, it is hard to determine which are smaller offshoots of larger groups and which are independent entities. This section includes some of the key paramilitary groups active in the region:

BRN-Coordinate (BRN-C) Pattani Malay National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate, or Barisan Revolusi Nasional Pattani-Melayu-Koordinasi: thought to be one of the key groups behind much of the violence in the far south. It is one of three politically more moderate factions that formed in the 1980s from splits in the original BRN (which was established in 1960).  The other two factions, BRN-Ulema and BRN-Congress, are now largely defunct.

The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO): Formed in 1968, PULO was the most active group in the 1970s and 1980s. It claims to have a working relationship with the BRN-C but is not thought to have much command over current insurgent operations. PULO is seen as more of a political umbrella organisation for the myriad paramilitary groups thought to be involved in the insurgency. Today, it operates mainly from exile in Syria and Sweden, from where a number of websites are run, carrying news from the region as well as political statements.

Islamic Mujahidin Movement of Pattani (GMIP), or Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani: Established by Afghanistan war veterans in 1995 and is committed to forming an independent Islamic state. GMIP is suspected of having links to international Islamist militant organisations.

Bersatu (the United Front for the Independence of Pattani or Barisan Bersatu Merdeka Pattani): Formed in 1989 out of four smaller groups: BRN-Congress, elements of PULO, the then GMP (now defunct), and Barisan Islam Pembebsan Pattani, and the now largely defunct Islamic Front for the Liberation of Pattani.

Pemuda: Meaning ‘youth’ in Malay, has been adopted as the name of a youth movement closely associated with BRN-C. Pemuda members are largely thought to be involved with providing logistical support, intelligence gathering and other non-violent aspects of the independence movement. However, some intelligence sources claim they are involved in more violent attacks, including drive-by assassinations and bombings.

Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani(BNPP), or National Liberation Front of Pattani: Considered the first organised armed resistance group. It reorganised in 1960, but traces its origin to a local revolt in 1947 in Narathiwat. Reasonably active in the 1970s and early 1980s, it is now believed to be defunct.

Royal Thai Army: Around 30,000 troops are stationed in the restive southern border provinces in an attempt to quell the insurgency. Troops fall under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the RTA, General Anupong Paochinda (as of August 2010), and the head of the Fourth Region Army, General Pichet Wisaichorn (as of August 2010).

Wider Political Unrest

People

Yingluck Shinawatra: Youngest sister of Thaksin, leader of the Pheu Thai party and likely the country’s first female Prime Minister. The 44-year-old telegenic businesswoman captivated the country in her 2011 election campaign, completely wrong footing her political rivals and leading her party to a majority victory. Many see her, however, as nothing more than a proxy for her brother.

Abhisit Vejjajiva: Former Prime Minster of Thailand and leader of the Democrat Party since 2005. The England-born, Oxford-educated economist was seen by many as a shining hope for the future of Thai politics but his reputation has been tarnished amid continuing political turmoil since coming to power and the violent crackdown on anti-government protesters in May 2010.

King Bhumibol Adulyadej: Thailand’s much-revered head of state. Ruling over a constitutional monarchy, King Bhumibol assumed the throne in 1946 and is now the world’s longest reigning monarch. His health has been an issue of concern for many years but anxiety over the succession of the throne remains largely a taboo subject.

Thaksin Shinawatra: The highly controversial and divisive former Prime Minister of Thailand (2001 – 2006) and founder of the Thai Rak Thai party.  Thaksin was deposed as Prime Minister in a military coup in 2006. The former telecoms tycoon and multi-billionaire businessman is currently in self-imposed exile overseas after being found guilty in absentia of corruption and sentenced to a two-year jail term. Thaksin is accused of bankrolling the ‘red shirt’ protests movement that has been seeking to oust the Democrat-led coalition government since it came to office in December 2008.

Sondhi Limthongkul: Controversial media mogul and businessman who broke away from his former ally Thaksin Shinawatra to found the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protest movement.

Gen Prem Tinsulanonda: Highly-influential Privy Council President and former Prime Minister (1980 – 1988), accused by his opponents of masterminding the September 2006 coup to oust then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn: Crown Prince of Thailand and heir to the throne.

Newin Chidchob: influential politician and former Thai Rak Thai cabinet member and Thaksin ally. He is the de-facto leader of the Bhum Jai Thai Party, which defected from the pro-Thaksin coalition in December 2008, paving the way for the Democrat Party to lead a new coalition government.

Jatuporn Prompan: Peua Thai Party MP and one of the core leaders of the UDD. Jatuporn was arrested following the May 19, 2010 crackdown on “red shirt” protesters. He was a former student protest leader in the 1992 pro-democracy uprising and a former Phalang Dharma and Thai Rak Thai party MP.

Political Parties and Organisations

Democrat Party: Thailand’s oldest political party (formed 1946) and leader of the coalition government since December 2008. Support largely drawn from upper and middle classes, Bangkok and the south of Thailand.

Peua Thai Party: Pro-Thaksin political party formed in late 2008 by members of the People’s Power Party (PPP), which was dissolved by the Constitutional Court for electoral fraud in December 2008. The PPP itself was formed from the ashes of the Thai Rak Thai party, which was also dissolved by a military-appointed court following the 2006 coup.

People’s Power Party (PPP): A pro-Thaksin political party founded in November 1998. Briefly led by Thaksin Shinawatra in 2007 after his disposal as Prime Minister. After the party was dissolved by the Constitutional Court of Thailand in December 2008, the majority of PPP politicians joined the newly formed Peua Thai Party.

People Alliance for Democracy (PAD): Originally formed in 2005 out of a coalition of politicians, activists and others groups united against then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Their protest movement paved the way for the 2006 military coup. PAD protesters, also known as the ‘yellow shirts’, were also responsible for a range of high profile protests during 2008 and 2009, including taking over Bangkok’s main airport and a months-long siege of Government House.

New Politics Party: The official political party born out of the PAD movement.

United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD): A loose coalition of former leftist student leaders, communists, political activists and others that formed to oppose the military coup of September 2006 and subsequent military government. The UDD, known as the ‘red shirts’, were behind mass protests and a siege of central Bangkok in 2010 calling for the dissolution of parliament and new elections.  A military crackdown on the protests in 2010 led to the worst political violence witnessed on the streets of Bangkok in nearly two decades.

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Image by izahorsky published under a creative commons license

2010 was set to be an important year in the Nepali peace process, following the slow progress in 2009 in implementing the peace agreement and the creation of a new constitution. But even the first days of 2010 were dominated by increased tensions due to Maoists calling for a 3-day general strike, followed by several violent clashes with government supporters. In accordance with these events, 2010 proved to be a year of stalemate. The 28^th May deadline for a new constitution was postponed several times, leaving it unfinished up until now, while widespread strikes and protests by Maoists and now also Royalists continued.

After the Prime Minister’s 30^th July resignation, due to increasing pressure, the task of finding a successor resulted in a complete political deadlock, lasting for 7 months. Ironically enough, the PM stated in his last speech that his main reason for the resignation was to end the stalemate. Votes after votes were cast, and the situation became more and more intense until finally a change in voting rules at the beginning of 2011 led to a success of the UML party’s candidate Jhala Nath Khanal, who up until now proves to be unable to overcome the stalemate and create a cabinet. The country however is now on its own since the UN mandate ended – after a previous mandate extension until 15^th January – and all UMIN troops have left. Nepal’s main political players seem to have realised the delicacy of this new situation and were able to agree on a cross-party committee in charge of all armed forces, including an integration of the 19,000 Maoist ex-combatants.

Despite these improvements, the situation in Nepal remains highly tense, while the struggle for political control is still going on, and major issues such as competing calls from some regions for autonomy, are still outstanding and a final draft of the constitution remains out of sight.The civil war may be over and a truly democratic government in power, but Nepal’s fragile peace continues to be tested.

Photo credit: Leon Meerson

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Nepal: Conflict Resources

A range of reports and publications for further research on the conflict in Nepal.

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Nepal: Conflict Timeline

A timeline of the conflict in Nepal. Identifies the conflict flashpoints set within a historical persceptive.

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Nepal: Key people and parties

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No related posts.

Colombia is in the midst of an almost 50-year conflict between the government and several guerrilla groups. The human impact of the conflict has been enormous, with at least 50,000 lives lost to date, and one of the world’s largest populations of internally displaced people – many of whom have disappeared.

Despite being the oldest democracy in Latin America, the country has lacked national cohesion since its independence in 1810. As a result of the country’s three Andean mountain ranges, acting as natural barriers, and the division of society by class interests, Colombia has had a weak state, with vast areas of territory in which the government has de facto had no monopoly of justice and use of force.

Civil strife has been endemic to the development of the modern state of Colombia. The current conflict with armed guerrilla groups dates from the mid-sixties, but the origins of current conflict go back to the period of ‘La Violencia’ (1948-1958). Following the assassination of the popular charismatic leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala in 1948, an internecine conflict between the Liberals and the Conservatives took place. During this period, some peasants organised themselves into communities with the support of the Communist Party.

‘La Violencia’ came to an end through a constitutionally sanctioned power-sharing agreement between the Liberal and Conservative Parties, known as the ‘National Front’. The accord, however, eliminated political competition. Any political activity outside these two options was often repressed and attacks to communist enclaves led to the transformation of the peasant communities into mobile guerrillas, especially following the Cuba revolution in 1959.

By the late seventies there were about a dozen guerrilla groups. The most significant Marxist guerrilla groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN).

The activities of the guerrillas prompted the formation of right-wing paramilitary organisations, primarily the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), as a means of protecting landowners, drug lords and local businessmen from attacks and kidnappings by guerrilla forces. Whilst denied by the government, there are accusations of linkages between the paramilitaries and the state in waging war against the guerrillas. Since their origins, both forces (guerrillas and paramilitaries) have become increasing involved in criminal activities (such as kidnapping, extortion, bombings, murder, hijacking, etc.), and have given a new dimension to the problem of narco-trafficking. The penetration of drug-trafficking in Colombian society has contributed to widespread corruption and the delegitimisation of the political class. Over the years, the government of Colombia has held several peace talks and negotiations with guerrilla groups, with different degrees of success. Although guerrilla groups remain a threat to the government, it is currently believed that neither FARC nor the ELN have the military strength or public support necessary to assume power or pose a serious challenge to constitutional order. Recent years have also seen the power of the paramilitaries diminish. Following generous and controversial amnesty legislation which offered significantly reduced jail terms, by mid-2006 about 95 per cent of the total estimated AUC force was disbanded. Some demobilised fighters, however, have since reconstituted themselves into smaller and more autonomous units – collectively known as the Black Eagles (Águilas Negras). It is yet to be seen whether guerrillas would take advantage of the power vacuum left by the AUC.

In 2008, the ‘False Positives’ scandal rocked the country, with allegations that members of the army had murdered up to hundreds of civilians who were then passed off as rebels (the verified number killed is disputed). The story indicates just how much violence has become part of Colombian society.

Colombia remains the closest US ally in South America. The relationship between these countries strengthened with Plan Colombia, in which the US provides aid with the proclaimed aim of strengthening democracy, combating drug trafficking and terrorism, and promoting respect for human rights.  This alliance with the US, as well as ideological differences and territorial disputes, have intensified the friction between Colombia and neighbouring countries Bolivia, Ecuador and, in particular, Venezuela, with which relations have worsened in recent months. Tensions have increased due to an agreement which grants the USA access to up to seven military bases for joint anti-narcotics activities in Colombia.

Over the past half century, the conflict in Colombia has gone through various phases. The social and humanitarian impact, however, has been enormous throughout. After President Uribe’s bid to run for a third term was ruled unconstitutional, Colombia elected Juan Manuel Santos, a former Defence Minister under Uribe. The new government’s period will be decisive for the peacebuilding process and its consolidation.

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Colombia: Conflict Resources

Links to resources for further information and research on the armed conflict in Colombia

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Colombia: Conflict Timeline

Timeline of the main events leading to, and during the armed conflict in Colombia, from 'La Violencia' to the FARC and current problems with narco-traffickers

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Colombia: Key people and parties

Background information on the key people and parties involved in the armed conflict in Colombia

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Tensions in Sri Lanka first boiled over into a civil war in 1983, but the roots of the conflict extend far further than that. The conflict takes its roots from the tensions between the mainly Buddhist Sinhalese majority and the mainly Hindu Tamil minority, who now make up 82 per cent and 9 per cent of the country’s population respectively. Prior to the conflict these statistics were 74 per cent and 18 per cent, indicating the huge numbers of Tamils who have fled the country.

Prior to independence in 1948, the Sinhalese felt discriminated against by their British rulers, leading to the development of Sinhalese political nationalism. With independence and the establishment of a first-past-the-post electoral system, much of the power was placed in the hands of Sinhalese governments. These governments brought in legislation leading to the increasing marginalisation of the Tamil minority, including the 1956 Official Language Act. This led to increasingly strained relations between the two groups and numerous violent riots.

Photo credit: Foto_di_Signorina

Conflict History

This increasing violence led to the eventual outbreak of war in July 1983. Conflict in the North and East was mainly between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); however the violence in Sri Lanka has also been fuelled by insurrections carried out by the Sinhalese Peoples Liberation Front (JVP). The situation has also been worsened by the 2003 Tsunami which affected all of the communities in Sri Lanka. After the outbreak of war numerous attempts at peace negotiations and ceasefires were interspersed with further conflict outbreaks. After the failure of the most recent peace talks President Rajapaksa began a military offensive aimed at achieving complete victory over the LTTE. Victory was declared in May 2009 after the last of the LTTE controlled areas were captured, but numerous questions remain over the country’s prospects for peace.

Prospects for Peace

The presidential elections were held in January 2010. President Rajapaksa was re-elected with 57 per cent of the vote, but has faced allegations of intimidation and misuse of state resources. His main rival, General Foneska gained 40 per cent of the votes and was quickly arrested after the election.

It is clear that the country is still far from creating a stable peace. The issues at the root of the LTTE insurgency have not been addressed – in fact the brutal nature of the final days of the war may have exacerbated them. It is estimated that the war has killed approximately 80,000 people and displaced around 1 million civilians. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates there are approximately 370,000 internally displaced people in Sri Lanka. Navi Pillay, UN Commissioner for Human Rights in 2009 has accused both sides of war crimes and there is little indication that the government has any plans to deal with these allegations. In addition to the allegations against President Rajapaksa, there are allegations of government corruption, and the absence of media freedom raises further concerns.

Furthermore, despite considerably calm and fair parliamentary elections in April 2010 – with the expected ruling coalition’s landslide – the end of the year witnessed rising tensions and the newly elected Sri Lankan Parliament approving a constitutional change, allowing President Rajapaksa to seek an unlimited number of terms.

In February 2011, thousands of protesters, marking the one-year anniversary of the detention of the opposition leader in the aftermath of the 2010 elections, powerfully illustrated the fragility of Sri Lankas’s post-war society.

Displaced Civilians, Sri Lanka

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Sri Lanka: Conflict Resources

Links to online resources for further in depth analysis of the conflict in Sri Lanka.

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Sri Lanka: Conflict Timeline

A comprehensive, up to date timeline of the key events in the Sri Lankan civil war.

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Sri Lanka: Key People & Parties

A guide to the key people and parties involved in the Sri Lankan conflict

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No related posts.

On 9 July 2011 Sudan split in two creating the world’s newest nation – the Republic of South Sudan. South Sudan’s independence was the final stage of a 6 year peace agreement ending decades of civil war. However, peace is not yet guaranteed. As the South gains statehood, crucial issues such as border demarcation, sharing of debt, and oil revenues and the use of the North’s pipeline remain unresolved. Fighting in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Abyei threatens the stability of the peace, and there is ongoing tensions and violence on both sides of the border.

Problems are not confined to tensions only along the border. Less dramatic, but arguably more damaging is the serious rise in food and water prices, the lack of medical care and infrastructure, significant IDP flows, and poorly functioning economy of the South. These developments daily endangering lives simply through lack, and encourages reckless and desperate behaviour that can lead to violence. Both countries have significant internal conflicts to deal with. Decades of violence during the North-South civil war followed by a fragile peace agreement mean that legacies of violence remain and numerous localised conflicts continue. Darfur has caught the world’s attention. While the South is facing multiple rebel groups in the border states of Unity, Jonglei, and Upper Nile.

Historical Context

Sudan was ruled under British-Egyptian control between 1899 and1956 until they gained their independence, with Darfur joining the protectorate in 1916. The North and South were kept separate by their Anglo-Egyptian rulers until 1946. During this period the majority of development was focused in the North, with the South and other peripheral regions, including Darfur, were both politically and economically marginalised.

Photo credit: United Nations

North-South Civil War

When North and South Sudan were merged in 1946 the majority of political and administrative power was allocated to the North, leaving many in the South resentful. In the lead up to independence in 1956 the South initiated a rebellion motivated by fears of further marginalisation. This conflict was ended by a peace agreement made in 1972. Yet this fragile peace was soon ruptured by violations of the peace agreement, division of the regions, and the nationwide imposition of Sharia law leading to the outbreak of open conflict in 1983. This conflict lasted 22 years and is estimated to have killed 2 million people and rendered another 4 million homeless. In 2005 the Naivasha Agreement, or Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), was signed by the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum, bringing an official end to the conflict. However, trouble continues between the two Sudans, with fresh accusations by each side that the other is supporting rebel groups against their respective governments, causing instability along the border.

Sothern Independence

In accordance with the CPA a referendum was held on 9 January 2011 to determine whether the South should remain part of Sudan or become independent. A similar referendum was to be held in the disputed border region of Abyei to decide whether it joined the North or South, but this has been postponed due to a failure to reach an agreement on the terms of the referendum.

The result of the 9 January referendum was almost unanimous. Over 99% opted for independence in a ballot which was widely accepted as free and fair. The vote, however, did not address many issues which remain unresolved even today. Border demarcation is particularly problematic as 20% of the new border has not been agreed upon. Tens of thousands of refugees have fled conflict areas and post-independence citizenship complications have become a major issue with an estimated 2 million South Sudanese living in the North. Moreover the logistics of splitting oil revenues and the $38bn national debt have yet to be worked out. In the face of increasing violence and tension between the North and the South there has been several attempts by the AU and mediator Thabo Mbeki to bring about a resolution of the key issues. In October 2011 joint North-South committees were set up to work through the outstanding issues. However, tension has grown over the last two months regarding the production and transport of oil. The North has been charging well above average market prices for the use of its pipeline to Port Sudan, and withholding shipments until payments are made by the Southern government – attracting accusations of attempting to ‘sabotage the South’s economy’.

Photo credit: United Nations

The “Three Areas”

As well as the referendum for South Sudan, the CPA also included provisions for determining the future of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, collectively known as the “Three Areas”. Abyei is an oil-producing region claimed by both the North and South. South Kordofan and Blue Nile were the front line during the civil war, being Muslim majority border states with many who fought alongside the Southern SPLM but lie on the Northern side of the 1956 border.

The CPA called for Abyei to hold a separate referendum coinciding with the vote for independence, on whether to become part of a future independent South or stay with the North. But failure to agree on important aspects of the vote meant the referendum did not go ahead as scheduled.

The main complication for Abyei is the status of the Misseriya tribe – Arab nomads who migrate into Abyei for a few months each year. The Misseriya fear that if Abyei is included in the South they will lose crucial grazing rights. Khartoum insists that they be allowed to vote in any referendum. The South, on the other hand, believes that only the permanent residents of Abyei – predominantly the Ngok Dinka tribe – should be allowed to vote.

Image by United Nations Photo published under a creative commons license

Just weeks before South became independent, under the pretext of self defence after SPLA attacked a convoy of SAF troops; the North seized Abyei by force and expelled the SPLM-aligned administration. Negotiations have led to an agreement to demilitarise the region, and the deployment of 4,200 Ethiopian peacekeepers – the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).
In South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the CPA called for holding “Popular Consultations” over whether the CPA itself was a satisfactory final settlement, or if the peace deal should be renegotiated in these areas. After significant delays these consultations began towards the end of 2010, but it is still not clear how the process should move forward.

Shortly before the South became independent, fighting erupted in South Kordofan as the North ordered all former-SPLA fighters north of the border to give up their weapons. So far ceasefire negotiations have failed to end the violence. Likewise, Blue Nile state has seen eruptions of violence. On the third of September a state of emergency was declared, causing roughly 100 000 people to flee.

Southern problems

Both the North and South face significant internal challenges in addition to the fragile cross-border peace. For the South a number of rebellions have emerged in the border states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile.

The South has repeatedly accused the North of supporting the rebels. In March 2011 it produced documents claiming to prove that Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was heading a plot to overthrow the SPLM – accusations the North denies.

On independence the South is already one of the poorest countries in the world. It is tasked with the herculean effort of building a state almost from scratch and diversifying its sources of income, over 90% of which comes from oil.

Significant social challenges face the new Southern State regarding imports and the management of the economy, IDPs, and governance challenges. All foodstuffs and consumables not produced in the South needs to be imported. This has led to shortages in food stuffs and basic necessities, as the North cut off imports and closed roads. Other countries from which the South imports (mainly Uganda and Kenya) are yet to recognise the new South Sudan currency, as it is not yet part of the East African Community. This has led to the ‘dollarization’ of the economy, as imports have to be paid for in USD, rendering the South Sudan Pound essentially worthless. The cost of imports has also rocketed, with basic goods costing between two hundred and four hundred percent more than they do in neighbouring Uganda, high and inflation continuing to push up prices.

With Southerners losing the right to remain in Northern Sudan since the post-independence ruling by the Sudanese parliament, a desire to vote and be part of the ‘new Sudan’ and continued violence in the states north of the border roughly 100 000 IDPs have flowed in from North Sudan. This has created tensions over resources in the border states, as already struggling infrastructure and scarce resources, attempts to support growing numbers of people.

Governance of the new country continues to be difficult, with corruption and mismanagement in the Southern government reportedly to be high. Movement towards the creation and enactment of legislation, the delivery of social services, and construction of infrastructure has been slow or non-existent. For example, the multi-donor trust fund which has drawn contributions from a number of international bodies and states has only given out 10% of the possible funds intended to benefit the new state. This is because the necessary legislation to manage the money has not yet been passed in parliament, further restricting the implementation of basic services and infrastructure.

There are significant problems of violence, as factions which have split off from the SPLM/A, or were in opposition to the party prior to it taking power are responsible for violent disruptions in a number of Southern states. Cattle rustling and local conflicts within the state continue to be a source of violence too, fuelled by the proliferation of small arms and lack of strong policing or law enforcement measures. The SPLM itself as a party is facing political fractures along political and leadership lines within – further complicating efforts towards strong and effective governance.

Darfur

For the North, the major source of conflict is Darfur. Tensions in Darfur began building in the 1980s when severe drought drove many from Northern Darfur towards the south, increasing land competition. This problem was exacerbated by varying ideas about land ownership, and the abolishment in 1989 of local councils who would traditionally deal with such conflicts. In 2003 the Darfuri Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rose up against the government. Arab militia, known as Janjaweed, have used scorched earth tactics in the region which includes the widespread rape, killing and abduction of both rebels and civilians. The government is widely accused of using the Janjaweed to respond to the rebellion; they deny this.

Photo credit: United Nations

In 2009 the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir, citing his government’s links with the Janjaweed militia. The UN estimates that 300,000 may have died as a result of the conflict, although the Sudanese government puts this figure closer to 10,000. Up to 2.7 million have also been driven from their homes and are now living in IDP camps in Darfur and refugee camps in neighbouring Chad and Central African Republic.

A ceasefire was signed between the government and a faction of the SLA in 2006, but this agreement was rejected by both the JEM and Al-Nur (another faction of the SLA). This fractured rebel alliances and changed the dynamics of the conflict. In 2008 a combined UN-AU peacekeeping force was deployed in the region (UNAMID). The JEM and government signed a goodwill agreement in 2009 and a ceasefire in February 2010. In 2010 talks stalled and all ceasefires – including the SLA – began to break down. However, in recent months , rebel groups in Darfur have shown a greater willingness to cooperate, both politically and militarily.

In June 2011, a new Darfur Peace Agreement was proposed by the Joint Mediators at the Doha Peace Forum. This agreement will supersede the Abuja Agreement of 2005. The proposed agreement includes provisions for a Vice-President of the Darfur region, and an administrative structure that includes both three states and a strategic regional authority to oversee Darfur as a whole. The agreement was signed by the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement on 14 July 2011.

Prospects for Peace

Despite huge oil revenues, the Sudanese economy prior to independence was still incredibly weak and the country was ranked as one of the world’s most corrupt states. Political tension was driven by both the failure of the CPA to recognise any rebel groups other than the SPLM, and the governments’ failure to implement many aspects of the CPA, especially in relation to democratic transformation, legal reform and accountability. In essence the CPA has really only achieved a division of power and wealth between the NCP in the North and the SPLM in the South. Numerous localised conflicts continue.

Photo credit: United Nations

Now, with separation, Sudan’s conflicts span a yet-to-be-demarcated border between two sovereign states. The conflicts are complex, multifaceted and interrelated. Yet conflict is not inevitable. Despite escalating violence neither side want a return to all out war. Progress, albeit sporadic, continues on Darfur where a recent civil society conference in Doha produced a framework agreement which has been accepted by all sides, and at least one rebel group, the Liberation and Justice Movement may be on the verge of signing a peace deal. The SPLM have also started to show signs of opening up the democratic process in the South to opposition groups.

The work of local peacebuilding organisations here is essential. They are able to build grassroots movements for peace and help traditional enemies resist violence. They are able to work in areas international organisations cannot access and are best placed to build peace in their own communities.

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Sudan: Conflict Resources

Links to a range of resources on the conflicts in Sudan. Features Both the North-South civil war and the crisis in Darfur.

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Sudan: Conflict Timeline

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Sudan: Key people and parties

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More than 4,400 people have been killed and thousands more injured in Thailand’s southernmost border provinces since a decades-long separatist insurgency reignited in 2004. Since then attacks on government sector services have become endemic. As well as state officials and security forces, local villagers, both Buddhist and Muslim, have also been targeted in attacks. Violence is also sometimes attributed to local criminal gangs and drug runners as well as retributive attacks carried out by state security forces.

Image by LightOnDude published under a creative commons license

The violence has almost exclusively been centered on the provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and, to a lesser extent, Songkhla. None of the groups thought to be behind the violence have claimed responsibility or made any official demands. The majority Muslim southern provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat formed part of the independent Sultanate of Patani before being annexed by Thailand in 1902. Intermittent unrest has plagued the region since.

Militant attacks have been retaliated to with hard-hitting military campaigns and an estimated 30,000 Thai troops are currently in the region. In a bid to stem the insurgency, the Thai government has enforced emergency rule in the area since mid-2005, handing security forces extended powers of arrest and immunity from prosecution, amongst other powers. It is unclear how much popular support exists, either for the militants or for independence from Thailand. It has been suggested that the heavy-handed repression of the insurgency by the Thai government has assisted their growth.

The resulting instability has mainly affected the agricultural and tourism sectors on which the poorest communities rely. The concern is that if the unrest continues it could transform into an ethno-nationalist insurgency, attracting Islamic extremists and having international reverberations.

Wider Political Conflict

Thailand has been beset by political instability since the elected government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted in a military coup in September 2006 following months of street protests and disputed elections. The country has struggled to rebuild a functioning democratic system since that military putsch, with opposing political groups increasingly taking to the streets and bypassing a weakened parliamentary system.

Against the backdrop of the deteriorating health of the country’s much revered 83-year-old king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, years of political tensions have uncovered stark political, social and ideological divisions, which have, on occasion, led to bombings and arson attacks and deadly clashes on the streets between opposing protest groups and between protesters and security forces. Despite prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s 2008 inauguration claim to give high priority to the southern insurgency, the governments weakness and its reliance on military personnel to deal with tensions in a widely unrestricted and uncontrolled way, led to a considerable upward trend in violence since 2009.

Image by Ratchaprasong 2 published under a creative commons license

A lethal government crackdown on protesters in early 2010 left nearly 100 people dead and 1,900 injured in the worst political violence in Bangkok in nearly 20 years. No one has been held responsible for those deaths and official inquiries into the incidents have been inadequate.

Elections in July 2011, the second national polls to be held since the 2006 coup, returned a massive victory for the pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai (For Thais) party, led by Thaksin’s younger sister, political novice Yingluck Shinawatra. Fears that the military would intervene to prevent Pheu Thai from taking power did not materialise. But in an increasingly polarised country, concerns remain over the fragile peace that exists between the two political camps seeking to steer the country’s political future. Talk of a deal cut between Thaksin and the military which would leave the armed forces beyond government jurisdiction is concerning. If the current government is hampered in its efforts or turns its attention inwards and away from the lofty democratic objectives it so proudly publicised in its election campaign, then further street protests are likely. Similarly, any moves to whitewash Thaksin could lead to a resurgence in anti-Thaksin demonstrations and efforts to compel the military to intervene once more.

Despite talk of reconciliation and efforts to rebuild confidence in the rule of law and the democratic system the country remains bitterly divided and there are wide held fears that the potential for further violence is increasing the longer a political resolution cannot be found.

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Thailand: Conflict Resources

Guide to online resources for further in depth analysis on the conflict in Thailand

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Thailand: Conflict Timeline

In-depth conflict timeline with an overview of all the key dates and flashpoints since 1902.

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Thailand: Key people and parties

An overview of the main people and parties within the Southern Thailand Conflict.

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In addition to this decline of the nation state, the current conflict is also intimately connected to the 1994 genocide in neighbouring Rwanda, where some 800,000 Tutsis were slaughtered at the instigation of the extremist Hutu government. In 1996 Rwanda’s post-war Tutsi government invaded the DR Congo in pursuit of extremist Hutu militias that had fled across the border to the Eastern provinces. Acting on the back of the troubles in the East, Rwandan-backed Congolese rebels in Kinshasa brought to an end Mobutu’s 32-year rule, and helped install Laurent Kabila as President.

In 1997, a rift between newly instated President Kabila and his former allies Rwanda, preceded to cause a new rebellion. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe sided with Kabila against Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed rebels as the country was turned into a vast battleground. In 2000 the United Nations Mission for Congo (MONUC) began, but the mission had a weak mandate and only 5,500 troops. The conflict continued to rage until 2003.

FARDC soldier at a parade. Photo credit: Spyros Demetriou.

Whilst the majority of Kabila’s Southern African allies withdrew, rebel groups remained active in the four Eastern provinces of South Kivu, North Kivu, Ituri, and Maniema. In 2004 Rebel fighting in the region intensified and widespread riots began in protest in response to the UN’s failure to act. In the same year, the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation into the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in DR Congo.

In 2006, the first free elections in 40 years saw Joseph Kabila become President, but failed to deliver international expectations of peace. Sporadic violence has continued into 2009 with Rwandan Hutu militias clashing with government forces in April. Fragile peace deals between rebel militias and the government have recently been signed, but clashes broke out again in August 2009.

The World’s Deadliest War

A major driver of the continued violence is minerals, namely coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold. Indeed, the cycle of violence that has enveloped the DR Congo since 1997 has presented opportunities for various armed groups, both state and non-state, to engage in the plunder of natural resources by creating and maintaining an environment of exploitation, instability and appalling inequality.

In Eastern DR Congo, militia groups and the state fight for control and access to mines, flourishing in the instability it creates. Demilitarisation means an end to the vast profits of the mines and this is an unattractive prospect. This violence and the turmoil it creates severely affects the agricultural livelihoods of the poor; reducing their capacity to produce and trade.

During the 1997 – 2003 conflict and in the continued violence, the human cost has been unprecedented. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) estimates that some 5.4 million people have been killed and some 3.4 million forced to flee their homes. This equates to some 45,000 deaths a month.

Equally as shocking is the unparalleled surge in rape cases by militias and soldiers against the local populations. Such sexual violence traumatises women and girls, humiliates their husbands and often leads to the break up of families. For these reasons, DR Congo is often referred to as the worst and most neglected humanitarian crisis on Earth.

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DR Congo: Conflict Resources

Links to key resources for further reading on the conflict in DR Congo.

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DR Congo: Conflict Timeline

An extensive timeline of the conflict in the DR Congo. Includes key flashpoints within an historical framework.

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DR Congo: Key People and Parties

A overview of the key people and parties involved in the conflicts in the DR Congo.

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