Introduction

The current conflict in the Niger Delta is driven by oil politics. Low intensity ethnic conflicts on a local scale have always been part of life in the Niger Delta. However, the vast wealth available to those who control the power structures of the state and the increasing polarisation of society has led to a significant shift in the underlying conflict dynamic. This struggle for political power and access to resources has often resulted in conflict. Oil companies have been charged with increasing this conflict dynamic by favouring host communities over others and making direct payments to the most troublesome elements in society to maintain the short-term peace. The failure by all stakeholders to address the underlying causes of the conflict and opt for short-term solutions has pushed the Niger Delta to the brink of an internationally important conflict.

Background to the conflict

The peaceful clamour for change and justice for the population of the Niger Delta was led throughout the 1990s by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Headed by Ken Saro-Wiwa, their struggle received international attention and when Ken Saro-Wiwa was hanged, on 10th November 1995, with eight other Ogoni activists, the world responded with collective condemnation. This peaceful action for change continues to date in the Niger Delta but is perceived by many as having failed to deliver, and therefore violence is a more attractive and acceptable option for many of today’s disengaged youth.

During the 1990s there were low intensity ethnic and community conflicts in the Niger Delta. The first real heightening of the conflict dynamic occurred in Warri in 1997 and continued on and off until 2003. This tri-ethnic conflict cost thousands of lives, immense human suffering and extensive loss to material investment. It laid the foundation for many of the militant groups that now dominate the general perception of the conflict in the Niger Delta.

The use of political thugs to secure the 2003 election resulted in the rise of the first seriously recognised militia group calling for substantive restructuring of the Niger Delta society and the removal of the oil companies. Dokubo Asari turned against his political paymaster, and created the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF). The international prominence of this group grew as they threatened the Western oil infrastructure, contributing to global oil prices rising above the unheralded $50 per barrel. Throughout 2004, the NDPVF fought not only the state security forces but also the right-wing Niger Delta Vigilante Services (NDVS) headed by Ateke Tom, a self-confessed political thug. The conflict between these two groups directly claimed hundreds of lives.

2006 has witnessed an increase in the boldness of militia groups and the intensity of the damage they inflict on the oil industry and the state. The arrest of Asari was followed by the rise of a new militia, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Since January the latest wave of violence has resulted in at least four kidnappings a month and numerous battles between the state security services and militia groups, increasing the pervading sense in society that the conflict will steadily increase. The impact of this violence has not only been huge on the lives of the population; it has also had a significant impact on world oil prices by locking in 800,000 barrels per day.

To date, the response to this mounting conflict has been to buy off the leaders of violence at a local and regional level. This approach has failed and will continue to fail because for every individual that is bought off there are twenty others ready to take his place and commit a greater level of violence in order to justify their own pay-off. This can not continue unless thousands of lives are to be lost.

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Conflict drivers

The failure of both military and democratic governments to ‘deliver’ the most basic of developmental needs to the people of the Niger Delta when they have grown rich from the resources of this region is the most serious underlying dynamic of the mounting conflict in the Niger Delta. In early January 1996 a Delta militant, Issac Borro, led a revolt against the Nigerian military government in response to the repression of the Delta people. This twelve day rebellion signalled the first significant attempt at using violence to change the situation. However, until the rise of democracy, violence tended to be limited to ethnic conflicts dominated by machetes and bottles. This has significantly changed in the last six years, and more sophisticated weapons and increasing numbers of armed youths are seriously challenging the state’s monopoly on force.

Economic

The dominance of corruption, the illegal economy and a focus on short term financial gain by all levels in society are significant conflict drivers in the Niger Delta. The vast wealth and impunity of those at the top and those associated with them through their patronage networks have resulted in a significant polarisation of society. One of the most obvious examples is that whilst much of Rivers State continues to lack pipe-borne water and electricity, the governor has two private jets, masquerading as air ambulances. The economic stakes are so high in the Niger Delta that unless legal alternatives are supported that do not focus on oil, the conflict for political office and control of the illegal economy, especially oil bunkering, will continue on its accelerating, self-replicating, violent path.

Social

The historical failure of all stakeholders, predominantly the state, to deliver even the most basic of developmental needs to a population living on top of one of the world’s largest deposits of oil and gas has created serious resentment and frustrations at all levels of society. Democracy has also failed to deliver, and the population has become further disenfranchised. This has created a situation where most citizens, even those who promote peace, can understand why some have turned to violence to bring about sustainable change. Violence is becoming an accepted norm in society.

Political

The historical legacy of military rule and oppression of the people has not changed since the supposed rise of democracy in 1999. There is still a standing army securing the oil infrastructure from the population and protecting the politicians who fail to use the resources at their disposal for the good of the people. The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) control every single seat at all tiers of government in Rivers State and received in excess of 90% of the eligible vote across the region in 2003. This vote is obviously false and was secured not only by rigging the elections but by empowering local youths with weaponry. This armed mobilisation of the youth in the run-up to the 2003 elections across the Delta States was a significant conflict escalator in the region.

Many of the youths now leading the militant groups agitating for change graduated to the use of violence in conflicts over political office – most significantly the 2003 Warri Crisis, which was fought over the positioning of a local government office. All commentators on the ground are expecting the 2007 electoral process to be very violent. The lesson was learnt in 2003 that you need to have a monopoly of firepower to secure the elections. The resources are available for politicians who have the political and personal will to deliver significant benefits to the lives of their fellow citizens. If based on bottom-up and locally owned initiatives, this would be enough to prevent the conflict from escalating.

Ethnic

Although conflicts in the Niger Delta have been ethnically charged, especially in Warri, ethnicity has been used as a motivator for underlying political and monetary gains. Ethnicity is a secondary driver of conflict in the Niger Delta even if used as a primary agent of violence.

Religious

Religion plays no significant role in the conflict of the Niger Delta, although the various religious groups could do more to condemn the underlying political corruption that is helping to drive this conflict.

Environment

The oil industry has had a significant impact on the environment and lives of the people of the Niger Delta. Gas flares burn 24 hours a day in many communities as a constant reminder to the people that the oil industries are working with the government and not the people. The impact of significant oil spills across the region since the mid-1960s has also reduced the potential for traditional livelihoods – fishing and farming – to remain sustainable for the population. The reduction in subsistence living is creating more disaffected young people who are ideal targets for manipulation and use in violent activities.

External intervention

The failure of foreign donors to support civil society groups in the Niger Delta and the policy of international governments, with the exception of the EU, to leave development efforts in the hands of the oil majors, have furthered the belief locally that the US and UK governments are much more interested in securing the oil flow than in ensuring that the people have sustainable livelihoods. This approach is now seriously threatening the oil flow as well as the people.

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Trends

Apart from the uprising headed by Issac Boro, the Niger Delta was relatively stable under military rule. Localised inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts and agitations with the state security services were common, but not dominant.

The rise of democracy brought a hope to the population at large that has been quashed by the prevalence of political patronage and the illegal rigging of elections. The failure of issue-based politics to take root has produced a rapid increase in violence in the region, and has prompted threatened and actual serious attacks against the state security forces and oil infrastructure, the veins of the Nigerian economy.

The failure of all stakeholders to seriously address the underlying root drivers of the rising violence in the region leave it increasingly likely to be pushed into a sustained conflict.

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Impacts and consequences

Economic

Aside from being one of the main drivers of the conflict in the Niger Delta, the diversification of the economy also has the potential to be one of the main solutions to the mounting violence. The dominance of oil politics has caused people to focus disproportionately on gaining employment in the industry, or associating themselves with it in other ways. This has resulted in a mono-focus that neglects the potential for other economic activities based on local assets. It has also boosted the strength of the illegal economy and the emphasis on short-term financial gains at all levels in society, thus further undermining the attempts at economic diversification.

Social

The scrabble for meagre handouts from the oil economy has resulted in the internalisation and localisation of society. This allows politicians and militia leaders to manipulate local mistrust and misunderstanding and thus further reinforce the disenfranchisement of Niger Delta society. Another worrying dynamic is the increasing fracturing of traditional society hierarchy, as the disengaged youth become increasingly restless and challenge these traditional power structures.

Political

Politics has continued to support patrimonial systems that rely on corruption and the monopoly of violence. This is the single most important issue that must be addressed in the long term if there is ever to be real peace in the Niger Delta. However, this will not be achieved through supporting top-down reforms; there must be empowering pressures from below to endorse reforms and challenge those who resist.

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Latest Update on Nigeria from CrisisWatch (September 2007)

Three opposition Action Congress (AC) officials resigned 7 August to protest party’s refusal to join new government. President Umaru Yar’Adua retained control of energy portfolio: no energy minister named, special adviser appointed 10 August. Courts began hearing challenges to president’s April election victory; former president Olusegun Obasanjo ordered 14 August to testify. Yar-Adua suspended $145m health clinic construction contract to firm owned by Obasanjo aide, saying deal “illegal” 7 August. 22-member electoral reform committee announced 23 August; scathing EU election monitor report released same day - strongly rejected by Independent National Electoral Commission.

Rival gang violence paralyzed Port Harcourt early August: at least 15 killed. Heavy fighting between security forces and gangs 16 August; curfew imposed. Kidnappings continued, with Nigerian nationals especially families of local legislators increasingly targeted. MEND said it would renew attacks on oil pipelines by month end because government failed to address Delta crisis. Security forces 1 August demolished Sokoto headquarters of Shiite sect accused of killing Sunni cleric July.

Published at the beginning of each calendar month, CrisisWatch is produced by the International Crisis Group.

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Resources, Links and References

Insight on Conflict is not responsible for the content of external internet sites

Amnesty International - Reports and documents on humanitarian issues in Nigeria

BBC: Nigeria - Country profile on Nigeria

Economist: Nigeria - Country briefing on Nigeria by The Economist magazine

Ethnologue - A guide to the languages and ethnicities of Nigeria

Government of Nigeria - Government information on Nigerian political and social issues

Human Rights Watch - Articles and publications relating to human rights in Nigeria

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre - Comprehensive overview of the Nigerian conflict, including the latest figures on IDPs

Political Resources - Provides links to political parties and organisations operating in Nigeria

ReliefWeb - A leading online gateway to information on humanitarian emergencies and disasters

United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) - News, background information, analysis, and policy documents relating to Nigeria's internally displaced population

University of Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict Research - Detailed overview and commentary on Niger Delta conflict

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