Background

The Colombian conflict involves the state and three main non-state armed groups: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by their Spanish initials, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which are left-wing guerrilla groups, and the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), which is an umbrella organisation of right-wing paramilitary groups. Many accounts site the origin of the current conflict with the founding of FARC in 1964; others argue that its roots date back to earlier conflicts (such as a period known as La Violencia starting in 1948); and still others claim that there has not been one continuous conflict since the 1960s but a series of conflicts with periods of peace in between.

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Geography

Colombia is a large territory, one sixth of which is tropical Amazon forest. The country is relatively sparsely populated, and the road network is poor. These conditions contribute to a great diversity in attitudes and perceptions towards the conflict since violence is inflicted and experienced very differently in different regions. Particular forms of violence affect different sectors of society and different geographical regions to a greater or lesser extent, but the whole country is affected in some way or other.

The complexities of the violence in Colombia have given rise to a uniquely Colombian academic discipline, ‘violentology’, and the literature no longer refers to violence in the singular but to 'las violencias', to highlight its multiple manifestations. In general the situation is more uncertain and difficult in the countryside than in the cities, although a recent increase in urban guerrilla tactics may be shifting the balance slightly. From 1992 to 2003, the number of combatants (guerrilla, military and paramilitary) increased and the violence spread geographically. The country also saw a parallel increase in conflict-related crime as combatants increased their participation in the drug trade, extortion, kidnapping, money laundering, illegal exploitation of minerals, and common theft in order to finance the violence.

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International Influences

The conflict has become increasingly internationalised and the United States has become more involved by providing financial and military assistance to the Colombian government for counter-narcotics and, more recently, counter-insurgency operations. Since the 1980s, the US has, according to Leech (2002), poured in 'hundreds of millions of dollars of aid and arms, along with hundreds of military personnel – worsening the violence, threatening the fragile stability of the region, and increasing the suffering of the Colombian people.' Such a level of involvement must have considerable impact, whether positive or negative. The internationalisation of conflict is by no means unique to Colombia, and the increasing international involvement in conflicts has become more and more common as the notion of state sovereignty breaks down (Kaldor 2001).

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Levels of Violence

Colombia has the highest kidnapping rate in the world and more than fifty thousand people have died in political violence since 1980. However, distinguishing between conflict-related and non conflict-related crime is very difficult and it may be more useful to consider the total number of homicides. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2004), in 2000 there were 26,539 intentional homicides recorded in Colombia, a rate of 62.74 per 100,000 inhabitants; only one country (Swaziland) had a higher rate.

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Economic Impact of the Conflict

It is likely that the conflict has led to a lower GDP per capita, lower domestic savings in absolute terms, less investment (domestic and foreign), and reduced government revenue. Transaction-intensive activities within the private sector are likely to have fallen relative to less transaction-intensive ones, and an increasing proportion of government expenditure is likely to be devoted to the military, at the expense of economic and social spending.

Conflict generates direct costs (losses of physical and human capital) and indirect costs (divestment and allocative distortion – the use of productive assets to fight the rebellion). Economist 'violentólogists' have been attempting to measure these costs in Colombia for several years (Rubio 1997; Arbeláez et al 2002; Riascos and Vargas 2004) but there remains extensive debate as to the accuracy of different methods of calculation. One estimate suggests that had Colombia achieved peace 20 years ago, the income of an average Colombian today would be 50 percent higher and 2.5 million more children would be living above the poverty line (US$2 per day).

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Internal Displacement

In recent years, hundreds of thousands of Colombians have been forcibly displaced by all parties in the armed conflict. This is often not just a by-product of the conflict, but represents a deliberate strategy to move or terrorise populations. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2000), there were a total of 1.8 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Colombia in 1999, while the Norwegian Refugee Council claims there were 2.9 million in 2003. Displacement affects all 32 departments of Colombia, both in terms of expulsion and reception, though regions of expulsion are predominantly rural.

Forced displacement is a defining characteristic of the Colombian conflict, and has particular implications in the context of poverty and development. Colombia has very advanced legislation on IDPs but displaced people are often not able to claim all of the official support to which they are entitled, and tend to live on very low incomes with little or no access to healthcare. In addition, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimated that in 2005 44% of IDPs in Colombia were aged between 5 and 14, and 70% of displaced children never return to school.

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Peace Processes

Although there have been gaps in the process, Colombian governments have been trying to make peace since the formal end of the Frente Nacional and the presidency of Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978). Limited successes have been achieved, such as the demobilisation of some guerrilla groups and their incorporation into electoral politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the rewriting of the constitution in 1991. The level of violence has varied, but peace has remained elusive.

President Pastrana (1998 to 2002) launched a peace process based on negotiation but critics labelled the approach (which involved ceding an area of land the size of Switzerland to the FARC) too soft. The talks collapsed as it became clear that the FARC were using the demilitarised zone to re-assert their military capabilities. In 2002, the current president Alvaro Uribe was elected on the promise of a much tougher stance against the guerrilla groups and since then he has followed a tough "democratic security" policy and levels of violence have gone down, particularly in urban areas.

A controversial demobilisation process for the right wing AUC started in 2003 under the Justice and Peace Law. According to this law, those accused of massacres and other serious acts can benefit from reduced sentences in return for confession, cooperation and surrendering any illegally obtained assets. Furthermore, if they go along with this process, the Colombian government will not extradite them to the United States on drugs charges. From a human rights perspective, the Justice and Peace Law has been criticised as too lenient. Reportedly, some 30,000 paramilitaries have disarmed.

Despite this apparent success, however, there are two key problems even beyond the criticisms already mentioned. The first relates to what the demobilised paramilitaries will do now, and how to prevent their return to violent crime. The second relates to the links between the government and paramilitary violence in the past. Although such links have been well documented in the past by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, new accusations have come out during the trials of former paramilitary leaders and some prominent politicians (including some very close to Uribe) have been named. This may not be good for the country’s government and its reputation in the short run, but in the longer term it is important to uncover the truth about official involvement in the violence.

Uribe’s efforts at peace have focused on the demobilisation of the paramilitaries. However, any peace process in Colombia needs to deal with more than one armed group, and Uribe’s government has maintained on-off peace negotiations with the ELN via meetings in Havana or contact through an intermediary in Colombia. To date these talks have made little progress and the most recent round has been characterised by misaligned priorities and objectives. Negotiations with FARC have been non-existent, and despite various military successes against FARC that have pushed them back to remote areas, the guerrillas continue to control large areas of the countryside. Efforts by third parties to broker a humanitarian exchange of prisoners and hostages with the FARC have not borne fruit. Even if it is possible to reintegrate the demobilized paramilitaries into society without returning to violence, it is unlikely that a successful peace deal can be brokered with either FARC or the ELN during Uribe’s presidency.

by Miriam Bradley

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Latest Update from CrisisWatch (January 2008)

Venezuela President Hugo Chavez helped broker deal for release of 3 hostages held by FARC. But Venezuelan rescue operation collapsed when FARC claimed 31 December security conditions not met; exact reasons unclear. FARC had rejected earlier proposal by President Alvaro Uribe for 30-day “zone of encounter” to facilitate negotiations towards broader hostage swap. Several countries offered assistance. French President Sarkozy appealed directly to FARC head Manuel Marulanda 6 December to release hostages; Paris offered 19 December to accept FARC rebels freed in any exchange. OAS said paramilitary threat remains despite demobilisation process; Colombian security forces arrested alleged leader of “Los Nevados” New Illegal Armed Group (NIAG) John Mario Osorio 17 December. Uribe-coalition Congressman jailed for paramilitary links 19 December.

Published at the beginning of each calendar month, CrisisWatch is produced by the International Crisis Group.

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Latest Update from CrisisWatch (September 2007)

Little movement on FARC-government hostage swap: FARC rejected President Uribe’s offer for 90-day “zone of encounter” to follow FARC hostage release and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s offer of exchange in Venezuela. Chavez-Uribe meeting 31 August decided Chavez to invite FARC for negotiations in Venezuela; rebels yet to respond. UN said 500 displaced by fighting in Narino province over border with Ecuador. No agreement reached in new round of ELN-government talks in Havana 20-25 August.

Published at the beginning of each calendar month, CrisisWatch is produced by the International Crisis Group.

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Resources, Links and References

Insight on Conflict is not responsible for the content of external internet sites

ABColombia - News, documents, analysis, and commentary relating to the Colombian conflict, in English and Spanish

Accord Colombia Project - Publication on peace-building in Colombia

Actualidad Colombiana - News, analysis, and information on the Colombian conflict, in Spanish

Amnesty International - Reports and documents on humanitarian issues in Colombia

BBC: Colombia - Country profile on Colombia

Cambio - Colombian news site, in Spanish

Colombia Human Rights Network - News and background to Colombian conflict, in English and Spanish

Colombia Libre - Official website of the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), in Spanish

Colombia Support Network - Background information, news, and literature relating to the Colombian conflict

Conflict Analysis Resource Centre (CERAC) - Research, analysis, and publications relating to Colombia's civil conflict, in Spanish and English

Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia - Official website of the Colombian ombudsman, containing reports and publications relating to the general state of human rights in Colombia, in Spanish

Derechos Colombia - Links to organisations, reports, and articles relating to human rights issues in Colombia

Economist: Colombia - Country briefing on Colombia by The Economist magazine

Ethnologue - A guide to the languages and ethnicities of Colombia

Government of Colombia - Government information on Colombian political and social issues, in Spanish

Human Rights Watch - Articles and publications relating to human rights in Colombia

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre - Comprehensive overview of the Colombian conflict, including the latest figures on IDPs

International Alert - Background information and projects run by IA in Colombia

International Crisis Group - A comprehensive resource for information on the conflict in Colombia

National Liberation Army (ELN) - Official website, in Spanish

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) - Reports on humanitarian issues in Colombia, in English and Spanish

Peace Brigades International - Latest news and reports, plus details of PBI's projects in Colombia

Political Resources - Provides links to political parties and organisations operating in Colombia, in Spanish

ReliefWeb - A leading online gateway to information on humanitarian emergencies and disasters

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) - Official website, in Spanish

Semana - Colombian news site, in Spanish

United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) - News, background information, analysis, and policy documents relating to Colombia's internally displaced population

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) - Overview and documents relating to the Colombian conflict, with particular emphasis on the impact of the conflict on women

University of Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict Research - Detailed overview and commentary on Colombian conflict

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