I collected data from five conflict prevention initiatives working in Sudan. I was lucky to have participants from different categories of conflict prevention initiative – an intergovernmental organisation, two international NGOs, a local NGO, and a multinational. This allowed me to compare results from organisations with different levels of local representation.

I came up with several key learning points, with both practical and theoretical implications.

Discussing peace programmes in Sudan. Photo credit: NonviolentPeaceForce.org

So, can conflict prevention initiatives prove their worth?

To do this successfully, initiatives must deal with the ‘attribution gap’- the difficulty of pinpointing the reason for success or failure of peace programmes. They do this by breaking down impact measurement into manageable chunks, in recognition of the grey areas of success and failure in the peacebuilding field (for example, whether communities were better informed about how reconciliation would impact their livelihoods).

In addition, I found the following key learning points.

Key learning points

1) Evaluation as evidence for influencing

Evaluation is one way of building evidence to influence donors and international organisations. Evaluation documentation was on the whole intended for viewing by donors, often in the donors’ prescribed formatting.

2) Wider roles of peacebuilding evaluation

As well as donors, participants listed numerous stakeholders, most significantly the intended beneficiaries and internal management. The role of evaluation vis-à-vis these stakeholders went beyond simply proving worth. Participants stressed the learning function of evaluation, ultimately aimed at improving the prospects for initiatives to contribute to peace.

3)  Importance of local representation

The research supports Peace Direct’s emphasis on locally led conflict resolution. The level of local representation was found to be an important factor in initiatives’ ability to work and demonstrate their value. Perhaps the most remarkable result was the fact that the local NGO research participant could continue its work in the face of violent conflict, unlike the intergovernmental organisation.

4) Accountability tension

Initiatives are accountable to a number of stakeholders. Consequently, there are potential or actual tensions between initiatives’ accountabilities (e.g. to donor vs to beneficiaries). The results indicated that the ‘accountability tension’ concept is intrinsic to peacebuilding evaluation, but that it can be negotiated successfully.

5) Theoretical implications

1. The results supported common criticisms (such as Duffield’s) of liberal peacebuilding in two ways. Firstly, peacebuilding evaluation was found to support a system based on Western cultural values. Secondly, research participants backed evaluation methodologies that were culturally sensitive to local cultures, such as participatory evaluation.
2. The results supported established work on the connections between different levels of conflict (i.e. between what Stathis Kalivas calls micro and macro levels), and showed that these connections between different levels of conflict are also relevant for conflict prevention work.
3. By combining (i) and (ii), the results illustrate how peacebuilding contributes to the dissemination of the Western cultural paradigm: peacebuilding evaluations demonstrate the value of interventions, using theories of change that demonstrate the transfer between micro and macro levels of conflict prevention.

6) Future guidance on peacebuilding evaluation

The results support the adoption of universal guidance on peacebuilding evaluation across the peacebuilding field.  Such guidance should be non-prescriptive, culturally sensitive, and acknowledge the accountability tension. I found that the OECD’s guidance on peacebuilding evaluation (currently under consultation) represents a problematic option for this as it runs the risk of being viewed with suspicion, given it is produced by a donors’ body. Instead, I suggest that guidance should be developed through a field wide process, as per the recent USIP and Alliance for Peacebuilding reports.

Implications for practitioners

1) Practitioners can use evaluations to address donors’ interests, building an evidence base for influencing them.

2) It is important to recognise that evaluators face a challenge to ensure that their accountability to donors does not come at the expense of internal values or intended beneficiaries.

3) The research results provide backing for the Peace Direct emphasis on the local. They do this firstly by identifying a need for locally led programmes (as the locally led programme was able to continue despite violent conflict), and secondly by highlighting the benefits of imbuing programmes with the target community’s knowledge and understanding.

4) When planning evaluations, it is essential to recognise that every programme represents a unique evaluation scenario. The most suitable evaluation approach should be selected by considering guidance such as the OECD or Mercy Corps resources, remembering to use participatory evaluation where possible.

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Community defence militia in South Sudan. Photo credit: fieldreports

Dear President Salva Kiir Mayardit,

We first would like to thank you for your excellent leadership over a turbulent period in the history of the Republic of South Sudan, starting from conducting a successful census in 2008, elections in April 2010, a referendum on 9th January, 2011, and independence on 9th July, 2011, as well as working to defuse the rampant tensions in Abyei, Jonglei, Unity and Warrap states.

In South Sudan, the LRA has killed at least 500 people, abducted 1,500 others, and wounded over 700. Over 25,000 people have been displaced from their homes, mostly in the areas of Ezo, Source-Yubu, Tombura, Nagero, Nzara, Yambio, Ibba, Maridi and Mundri West counties in Western Equatoria State.

We hope that this suffering will soon come to an end. We ask the South Sudanese government for a comprehensive approach and strategy on the LRA, which involves meaningful collaboration with regional and international partners.

We welcomed the announcement by the United States government to send 100 well-equipped military advisors to counter the Lord’s Resistant Army (LRA) menace and help protect civilians, and we hope you will work with them to ensure a more effective response to the LRA problem.

We are very happy with your public statements that South Sudan will never go back to war again. Please help make this a reality by collaborating with neighboring governments to bring an end to the LRA menace.

As a matter of fact, it is true that when one part of the body is suffering, the whole body feels pain. Since signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that brought about a permanent ceasefire and relative peace and stability in other parts of the country, the people of Western Equatoria State have never enjoyed complete peace because of the Ugandan rebel group which has terrorized, killed and massacred, and still continues to abduct people, especially children. They have turned boys into fighters and girls into sex slaves, destroyed villages and confined people to camps living under fear of terror.

• Work together with United States of America (USA) troops deployed in the region to bring peace and stability in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazel States.
• Offer timely and adequate logistical support and additional military equipment to the SPLA forces to improve their capacity to deal with the LRA insurgency in the region.
• Take a lead in civilian protection and advanced relief preparedness through humanitarian NGOs for IDPs and ex-combatants.
• Encourage fruitful communication between the SPLA forces and the local population, the Arrow Boys, and with the national armies of DR Congo and the Central African Republic in their LRA-affected areas.

We are encouraged that with these steps, amongst other important initiatives, the government of the Republic of South Sudan can help put an end to the LRA threat for its citizens, as well as for the populations in the border regions of neighboring countries.

Yours sincerely,

Signed:

1. Association africaine de défense des droits de l’homme (ASADHO), Kinshasa, RDC
2. Association des victimes de la LRA, Obo, RCA
3. Association Zereda, Obo, RCA
4. Commission Diocésaine pour la Justice et la Paix (CDJP), Dungu, Haut Uélé, RDC
5. Commission Diocésaine pour la Justice et la Paix (CDJP), Duru, Haut Uélé, RDC
6. Commission Diocésaine pour la Justice et la Paix (CDJP), Ngilima, Haut Uélé, RDC
7. Commission Paroissiale pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP), Bangadi, RDC
8. Communauté des Églises Évangéliques en Centrafrique (CEEC), Zemio, RCA
9. ECS Nzara Diocese, Yambio, South Sudan
10. Justice and Peace Commission, Catholic Diocese of Tombura-Yambio, South Sudan
11. Société civile d’Ango (SOCIDA), Bas Uélé, RDC
12. Société civile de Doruma, Haut Uélé, RDC
13. Société civile de Faradje, Haut Uélé, RDC
14. Société civile de la Chefferie Mopoy (SOCICOMO), Banda, Bas Uélé, RDC
15. Société civile de Poko (SOCIPO), Bas Uélé, RDC
16. Solidarité et Assistance Intégrale aux Personnes Démunies (SAIPED), Dungu, RDC
17. Traumatisme blessure du Cœur, Zemio, RCA
18. Union des Jeunes de Doruma pour le Loisirs (UJDL), Doruma, Haut Uélé, RDC
19. Union of Journalists of South Sudan, Yambio, South Sudan
20. Unity Is Strength, Yambio, South Sudan

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Such a way does exist. Local sources in South Kordofan indicate that locally-led peacebuilding organisations remain active and influential throughout the province, despite the crisis. Peace Direct, a UK charity that supports such groups, reports the following current examples: the Native Administration of village chiefs are acting to exclude combatants from their areas; the rival Nuba, Misseryah and Dajou tribes have agreed to maintain a ceasefire between themselves; similar agreements have been made elsewhere in South Kordofan and in Unity state, south of the border.

Until external influence becomes more effective, such local peacebuilders are the best channel for mitigating this crisis at the community level. They are already in place, they have high levels of respect, knowledge and operational capacity, and they can evidently reach the areas and groups that outsiders cannot.

What they need is to be supported with funding for their work, and recognition for their insights and analyses of what is a highly complex conflict. I would urge the international community to make contact with them, listen to their views, and fund their operations. These brave people are not victims but agents of change – and it is they who eventually will rebuild their society.

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Photo credit: United Nations Photo

However South Kordofan does show there is an alternative. Since the 2005 peace agreement, locally-led peacebuilding organisations in both North and South have worked tirelessly to rebuild relations between communities ripped apart by civil war. Now, as the prospect of war again looms large, this work is paying of. To give just one example, in the west of South Kordofan, local organisations have brokered a ceasefire between the rival Nuba, Misseriyah and Dajou tribes. Similar agreements are in place across South Kordofan and south of the border in Unity State.

All too often local people are seen as merely victims of the conflict, but examples like this show agents of change. Where internationals are excluded from the ground in South Kordofan, it is left to local groups to act. When internationals find themselves with nobody to talk to, local groups can rely on long established relationships with local leaders to prevent communities being dragged into violence. As internationals are refused access, local organisations are there – because they’ve been there all along and will remain long after the current crisis is over. Local organisations are in place, with the capacity, contacts, and courage to respond rapidly and effectively.

The importance of local peacebuilding for long term stability is well-understood, but the current situation in Sudan shows that peacebuilders can and should play a role in short-term attempts to prevent violence. We send our best wishes to everyone in North and South Sudan on this historic day, and hope that those struggling to resist violence are able to prevent a slide into further conflict.

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News Round-up

• North and South Sudan have reached a landmark agreement on the status of the disputed Abyei border region, under which the Sudanese Army will pull back from the area and UN-mandated Ethiopean peacekeepers will move in.
• However, there are a number of outstanding challenges for North-South relations, including unresolved issues over oil sharing and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in South Kordofan, with an estimated 70,000 people fleeing armed violence. An unconfirmed report from the Bishop of Kadugli (capital of South Kordofan) alleges fighting at the UN compound at Shair.
• President Al-Bashir has sparked further tension with the SPLM following the Sudanese Army’s action against rebel fighters in the Nuba Mountains of central Sudan.
• Meanwhile, Al-Bashir faces continuing internal opposition, with the two main factions of the rebel opposition in North Sudan joining their operations. Outside of Sudan, Al-Bashir has found little respite, with his visit to China being delayed, though reports on reasons for this are inconclusive.
• Al-Bashir has also overseen developments on the Darfur situation, though the nature of these is open to interpretation: whilst he has said that the Darfur peace agreement is not negotiable, he has also agreed to delay a referendum on Darfur’s administrative status.

News in detail

Abyei

VOA: Sudanese Parties Sign Abyei Border Deal
North and South Sudan have reached a landmark agreement outlining the status of the disputed Abyei border region. The Abyei deal paves the way for progress on several other issues that need to be settled before the South’s July 9 independence.
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Agreement-Reached-on-Sudans-Abyei-Region-124195084.html

Reuters: Rights investigations needed in Sudan border areas – U.N.
Huts were still burning and looters roamed the main town of Sudan’s disputed Abyei region this week, a senior U.N. official said, more than a month after Khartoum shut down a joint North-South administration.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/06/24/uk-sudan-humanrights-idUKTRE75N27420110624

BBC: Sudan’s Abyei: US proposes UN peacekeeper force
The United States has tabled a draft resolution at the UN calling for more than 4,000 peacekeepers to be sent to the disputed Sudanese region of Abyei.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13898235

North-South relations

BBC: Sudan’s South Kordofan: ‘Bombings, blood and terror’
More than 70,000 people are said to have fled violence in Sudan’s South Kordofan state, where the government says it is disarming rebels.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13882924

BBC: Sudan to block oil pipeline if South will not pay
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has threatened to shut pipelines carrying South Sudan’s oil if a deal on oil is not reached before it secedes in July.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13870929

BBC: South Sudan returnee train attacked in South Kordofan
A train carrying South Sudanese back home from the North has been attacked by a Northern Arab group, leaving one person dead, the UN says.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13925407

Guardian: Fuel shortages grip South Sudan
Just weeks before independence, South Sudan is blaming the North for fuel and food shortages.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/jun/27/fuel-shortages-Southern-sudan

Wall Street Journal: Oil Looms Over Sudan Border Clashes
As July 9 split nears, sides are ‘far apart’ in talks over land and how to share revenues. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304231204576403631242209832.html

International

Guardian: Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir delays visit to China
A planned visit by Sudan’s president to China, which was criticised by human rights groups because he is wanted on international war crimes charges, has been delayed.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/27/omar-al-bashir-delays-visit-china

Bloomberg: Sudan President Al-Bashir’s Plane Forced to Reroute While on Way to China
Sudanese President Umar al-Bashir was forced to postpone meetings with Chinese officials yesterday after his plane was rerouted by Turkmenistan’s civil aviation authorities, a foreign ministry spokesman said. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-27/sudan-president-al-bashir-s-plane-forced-to-reroute-while-on-way-to-china.html

BBC: China defends visit by Sudan President Omar al-Bashir
Chinese officials have defended a decision to invite Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to China next week, after criticism from rights groups.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13857894

Sudan Tribune: UN chief call to establish South Sudan mission headed by ex- Norwegian minister
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called on the Security Council to establish a United Nations mission in South Sudan to be headed by the Norwegian Hilde Johnson.
http://www.sudantribune.com/UN-chief-call-to-establish-South,39320

South Sudan

Sudan Tribune: South Sudan opposition sides with SPLM against amendment of constitution
The leadership of one South Sudan’s opposition political parties on Thursday announced it was siding with the SPLM against voices calling for scrutiny and amendment in the Draft Transitional Constitution of South Sudan.
http://www.sudantribune.com/S-Sudan-opposition-sides-with-SPLM,39319

Al Jazeera:  Fight for the heart of the South
South Sudan faces the challenge of creating an inclusive administration among tribes with a history of bitter enmity.
http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/sudanthebreakup/2011/06/201162311444468410.html

Reuters: South Sudan should halve army after independence – UN
The United Nations on Tuesday called for Southern Sudan to halve the size of its army after independence in July, saying its mix of conflicting loyalties and former rebels could lead to insecurity.
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE75K0IO20110621

North Sudan

New York Times: As Secession Nears, Sudan Steps Up Drive to Stop Rebels
The Sudanese Army and its allied militias aim to crush rebel fighters in the Nuba Mountains of central Sudan, pitching another region of the country into crisis, according to United Nations officials and villagers who have escaped.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/world/africa/21sudan.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=sudan&st=cse

Sudan Tribune: SLM’s Al-Nur and Minniawi establish joint alliance body
The two main factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) – the rebel opposition in North Sudan – have announced the establishment of a joint political and military mechanism chaired by Abdel Wahid Al-Nur and Minni Minnawi.
http://www.sudantribune.com/SLM-s-Al-Nur-and-Minniawi,39341

AFP: Sudan seeks to tap ‘blue gold’ with new dam projects
Sudan is seeking to tap its abundant Nile waters with new dam projects, as the oil-rich South’s independence looms, but experts warn of the social and environmental costs, and the implications for the Nile water-sharing dispute.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jkZOIjrrXS_VeJ6Phk44tWknL2cA?docId=CNG.8684d0c4fc022391e25dcc498eda9e5c.181

Darfur

Sudan Tribune: Sudan’s president says Darfur peace document is not negotiable
Sudanese president Omer Hassan Al-Bashir said that the Doha Peace Document is final and not negotiable and warned that his government will fight the non-signatories of the draft text.
http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-president-says-Darfur,39335

Sudan Tribune: Sudan and LJM rebels agree on the date of Darfur referendum
The Sudanese government and the Liberation and Justice Movement agreed to delay the referendum on Darfur administrative status for one year after the signing of a peace agreement, as others issues remain unresolved.
http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-and-LJM-rebels-agree-on-the,39344

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Women at a water project in South Kordofan, Sudan. Thanks to SOS Sahel, uploaded under a Creative Commons Licence.

This is best seen in west Kordofan. In this area, the Dajou, Misseryah and Nuba tribes, located in the western mountains, have so far all agreed to reject the current violence. Until now there have been no violent events between them, despite the surrounding conflict. This follows a formal agreement made by themselves after they convened a meeting with each other to discuss the outbreak of inter-government conflict. Supported by the Deputy Ameer of the Nuba, tribal leaders of Dagu and Misseriyah and peace activists from all the communities, the agreement they made was published in the local media on the 14th of June. Similar agreements have been made elsewhere in South Korodofan and in Unity state, south of the border.

Even in the midst of the conflict as INGOs are bunkered down, the tribes are able to still communicate with each other. Aided by a network of peace activists created and supported by local peacebuilders, essential communication is maintained to prevent escalation of the violence. For the past two years, local groups have been working at a local level with individual communities, encouraging them to think about their own interests. They have acted as mediators to re-build relationships degraded by decades of conflict and they have equipped individual leaders and communities with the skills and the structures to respond to conflict non-violently.

At a time when most outside observers would expect history to repeat itself, the communities historically caught up in the violence between the SAF and SPLA have resisted. Local interventions have broken a cycle of violence that has lasted decades and so far that has prevented the outbreak of a new civil war.

However, as the pressure mounts and what seems to be an act of ethnic cleansing continues, there is a genuine fear that such peaceful abstention will be harder to maintain. It is imperative that the international community recognises the historical importance of these local level initiatives. The international community is right to seek to apply pressure at a government level but, in parallel, it must also recognise and support local approaches.

It may be too late to prevent the mass displacement and destruction in South Kordofan but it is absolutely vital that the international community learns from this episode. Whilst attention was focused on the CPA, progressive members of the international community, recognised that in such complex situations, local actors have the number, variety and contextual awareness to respond in a way that meets the scale of the problem.

Ironically, the international community continues to overlook local peacebuilders as too small scale but what we are seeing here is that, for all the money in the world, typical responses by the international community are far too simplistic and lack the sophistication to match the complexity created by decades of violence.

As the conflict moves towards Blue Nile state and violence continues to distract many in the south from Independence celebrations, there is still a chance that a new approach to the conflict in Sudan can be realised.

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An important question is: whose security interests do these states and international organisations pursue? When looking closer at what security really means to people, it becomes clear that security is first and foremost something personal. When asked what security is, the answers people give are varied, broad, and diverse. To some it is the absence of violence and war, to others it is being able to travel freely or work on their land, and again others include access to schooling and health provision. In general, people define their security in terms of what academics and practitioners refer to as ‘human security’. And the particular aspects of security they prioritise depend on their personal situation. Security is about what security needs are most vital, and what aspects of their security are threatened by their context. Based on how someone defines security needs and interests, and depending on context and position, people determine (consciously or not) their strategies in pursuit of their various security needs. This process can be referred to as the ‘local dynamics of security’.

A process in which people constantly redefine what security is to them, and how they pursue their security needs, means that these local dynamics of security are characterised by a constant struggle between different perspectives on security. Whose definition gains dominance over others? And based on these various definitions, what strategies in pursuit of their security do people deem appropriate?

Definitions and strategies can conflict, as what is security for one person can mean insecurity to another. Having been in the bush for years, where they were part of a social structure and able to obtain food, ex-combatants often find it difficult to reintegrate economically and socially in the civilian community. The social and economic security offered by the armed group falls away, and in their reintegration process they are expected to find different strategies to fulfil their needs. When they fail to find new (legal) strategies, they may opt to return to an armed group or criminal gang. As an ex-combatant in Burundi explained:

I was in the first year of primary school when I went into the militia and now going back to school is difficult. They should help me learn a trade. Now I’m in a situation where I sometimes think I’ll start stealing. Maybe find some friends with guns and form a group to steal.

Such a choice in pursuit of personal security clearly poses a threat to the security of others.

Also, state security actors at the local level are part of these local dynamics of security. In eastern Congo someone explained:

We are concerned with justice, and the police want money. We have no money, and the police are not interested in justice.

Police officers, too, define their own security needs, and strategies to pursue these needs. When their salaries are not paid, for example, they might use opportunities available to them to fulfil their security needs and harass the population for money.

The state security forces can contribute to security only if it adds to security as people on a local level define it. And where state security actors are seen to be oppressing or incapable of security provision, people find alternative ways to provide their security. For instance, in South Sudan where the LRA is attacking the local population, the South Sudanese army (SPLA) is not very active in protecting the civilians. In reaction to this lack of security provision, local chiefs have called on the youth to use their hunting skills and form a vigilante protection force.

To sum up, security is open for interpretation, there is a constant struggle over what is defined as security and what strategies people find appropriate to pursue their security needs. However, taking the local level as a starting point to look at security does not necessarily mean that the local level provides all the answers to the security problems that are encountered. As shown by the above example of an ex-combatant pursuing his personal security needs by re-joining a militia, what is the ‘right’ definition of security, and the ‘right’ strategy in pursuit of it, is in the eye of the beholder. Being involved locally is therefore not a panacea. It does, however, provide a better insight into how these security dynamics develop. And without understanding local security dynamics, how can an intervention bring about a positive change in security?

Also, taking the local level as starting point to look at security does not mean that the impact of national policies and international interventions can be neglected. On the contrary, national, regional and international actors are part and parcel of the local dynamics of security. State practices in security provision may make particular security strategies available, for example by providing a functioning police that acts in favour of local security needs. The state may also limit such strategies, such as when the police work against local interests, or when the state prohibits traditional structures of security provision.

Likewise, international organisations and donor countries can influence local security. This can be through the programmes they implement on the ground, such as by initiating an anti-guns campaign. It can also be through lobbying with the government of a country of intervention, for instance by pushing for security sector reform in diplomatic talks. Thirdly it could be through changes in national policies in the donor country itself, such as regulating the export of weapons.

Clearly, national, regional and international actors play a large role in the dynamics of security. But the effect of outside interventions on local security dynamics is often poorly understood, and this is problematic. Development projects can have unintended side-effects. For instance, rebuilding a few schools after conflict, at first sight sounds like a great project. But what if these schools were only situated in regions where a particular ethnic group lives? Without building new schools elsewhere, rebuilding these schools may risk reinforcing inequalities that gave rise to the conflict in the first place. Also, strengthening police capacity in a post-conflict country seems good, as often the police are ill-trained and poorly equipped. But for instance in Burundi, improving the capacity of security forces can also create security problems for the population, as its government is becoming increasingly authoritarian. An analyst in Sudan criticised such security sector reform interventions by international donors, and complained that such security interventions never have anything to do with democracy: training and equipping soldiers is done, but what does it bring? Shoot people better, kill better, torture better.

International organisations often argue that local actors have ‘capacity problems’. For example, they may lack particular skills in financial management or organisational planning. Therefore international organisations often design and manage projects themselves, and let local organisations implement projects under close supervision. It is true that capacity problems among local actors do exist. On the other hand, there is a capacity problem on the side of international organisations and donors – to truly understand the local context. What impact does a project have on the local security dynamics? How can a project be designed so that its impact is positive? These are questions that need local insights, and hence need local actors.

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The challenges facing a new nation

Image by United Nations Photo published under a Creative Commons Licence

A range of challenges are present themselves with this new nation attempting to stand on its own. Aside from the issues of governance and poor service delivery, the most serious is the seemingly unending internal conflicts. Hence, the government of the new South Sudan should consider:

1. Embracing pluralism by allowing political participation of the citizenry. To do otherwise could pave the way for more conflicts through insurgencies, militia activities, army defections, and latent grievances within the security sector.
2. Post-referendum negotiations between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and National Party Congress (NCP) should focus on ensuring a peaceful separation and a constructive North-South relationship based on mutual benefit from the oil resources, averting the ‘resource curse’.
3. South Sudan has to cooperate with its neighbours to overcome security threats by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and other militia, as well as cross border conflicts. The state of Western Equatoria is particularly suffering under rampaging LRA troops, displacing farmers, and potentially leading to a humanitarian crisis due to heightened food insecurity. Communities will increasingly turn to militia groups for protection if government security is absent.
4. At the national level, the significant role of opposition parties and civil society in the forthcoming transition needs to be acknowledged. There is thus a need for an inclusive constitutional review committee adhering to the agreements of the CPA.

The gravity of violence needs further deliberate and integrated efforts. The 2010 Human Rights Report: South Sudan noted the abuses and internal conflicts South Sudan faces at independence. Inter-ethnic fighting, post-election militia attacks, cattle rustling, and LRA attacks, all resulted in deaths and displacement in the South since the referendum.

Coupled with the violence, 2 million Internally Displace Persons (IDPs) and 350,000 refugees have returned to the South since 2005. Given the lessons learnt from the returnees of Liberia, there is a need to find ways of enhancing co-existence between host communities and returnees.

What role can grassroots peacebuilding play here?

Enhancing grassroots peacebuilding

Grassroots peacebuilding encompasses efforts of enhancing localised structures and mechanisms of constructively responding to violence, aiding relief, and conflict transformation. This vital approach is the social fabric that builds durable peace. It is the people at the grassroots who have suffered most from the war, and continue to suffer through displacement, grief, trauma and day-to-day community clashes. Peace is a common good that we must promote and guard.

March was characterised by community clashes in Mvolo between the Jur and the Dingas in Western Equatoria. Over 60 died and many more internally displaced. With a history of tribal clashes, cattle rustling, and growing insecurity, one would ask: what can be done at a grassroots level to enhance peacebuilding?

Improving accountability of security forces

Image by United Nations Photo published under a Creative Commons Licence

One option for grassroots level work is the improvement of security forces. There are several cases where security forces were blamed for instigating or participating in violence. As illustrated by these incidents, it becomes imperative for a new country to respect the rights and rule of law. It is through the promotion and protection of human rights that peace among the people is enhanced across all sectors and levels.

When looking at peacebuilding and security reforms in prior post-conflict zones, three lessons are obvious:

1. A lack of governance of the security sector is often a source of conflict and forms a key obstacle to peacebuilding.
2. Security institutions can play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in society.
3. If law-breakers face prosecution and social disapproval, people will be discouraged from engaging in armed violence. This is underlined by the 2011 Word Development Report, with the call for citizen security and justice in order to break the cycle of violence. Indeed, there is need to improve accountability among the security forces and fostering restorative justice in South Sudan so as to prevent and manage a relapse into violence.

Realise the role of religion

A second option for grassroots engagement is to work with and through religious communities and structures. In many cases the Church seems to have greater leverage than almost anybody else in brokering peace talks between warring factions. The historical, cultural and traditional embeddedness of the Church has credibility and relevance to the community. It’s extensive network reaches even into the most remote areas. Further, the Church has an integration of social and pastoral work focusing on the psycho-social and spiritual dimension of conflict transformation, although the church is at times blamed for exlusionist tendencies. As an indicator for church influence, around 40% of the population of South Sudan regard themselves Catholics and 30% Anglicans.

Quiet diplomacy

A third grassroots option is quiet diplomacy. Influential civil society leaders, among them high profile religious leaders, have the potential of applying preventative diplomacy mechanisms in cooperation with the government.

This back door approach is suggested because the state is still young. It is further backed up by the cultural background, suggesting that a leader should not be degraded in public. Instead of undermining transparency, this approach acknowledges the huge expectations of a new nation. Normal and open confrontation may be acceptable to the public, but may not bring about the desired democratic state.

Conclusion and recommendations

Grassroots peacebuilding has to be enhanced across South Sudan. This can be done through holding the security forces and leaders accountable; realising the essential (commending, condemning, correcting and coalescing) role of the Church, and the application of quiet diplomacy. It is hoped that localised and indigenous peacebuilding efforts can consolidate peace, stability, security and development. Therefore, I would like to make the  following recommendations:

1. People, parties and civil society to:
   • strengthen women, youth, and community participation in peacebuilding;
   • empower local government structures;
   • invest in education and especially adult literacy;
   • adopt a comprehensive security framework of human security;
   • continue applying corrective and commending public figures through quiet diplomacy.
2. The government of South Sudan to:
   • build supporting impartial partnerships towards grassroots peacebuilding;
   • enhance trauma healing across all sectors and levels of the country;
   • establish and empower local government structures so as to enhance accountability among county and state executives;
   • deploy security personnel, especially the police, to actively protect the citizenry from community clashes, militia attacks, and the LRA;
   • invest in education in every village;
   • retain and emphasise the rule of law across the country.
3. The international community:
   • to support grassroots peacebuilding through partnerships;
   • to encourage and facilitate continued dialogue and cooperation between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan.
   • to build impartial supportive partnership with the people of South Sudan and its government, while drawing a clear line between the government and the SPLM.

Hope Chichaya, May 2011

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South Sudan aims to be independent in July 2011, after having signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. For the citizens in this area however, the peace is far from comprehensive. Many citizens even lament that their security deteriorated since the CPA was signed. The LRA has terrorized the area since their peace talks with the government broke down in 2006. Thousands of people have had to flee, hundreds have been killed and many have been abducted by the LRA. People have been openly slaughtered and horrifying stories abound. Fear for the LRA is omnipresent and people have become desperate.

Who can you talk with when Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, hides in the jungle in the borders of Central African Republic and DR Congo? What does a comprehensive peace agreement mean when your sons are abducted, your wife raped and your father killed?

The idea that peace needs to be build up from the grassroots is valid, but how can you talk about peace when the enemy has no clear objective and kills seemingly at random? Who can you talk with when Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, hides in the jungle in the borders of Central African Republic and DR Congo? What does a comprehensive peace agreement mean when your sons are abducted, your wife raped and your father killed?

Because neither the SPLA (the army of South Sudan), the police nor the UPDF (Ugandan army) has been able to provide security in the remote villages along the borders, the citizens of WES decided to take matters in their own hands. Through a network of paramount chiefs (traditional leaders of the communities) a civilian defense force was formed and dubbed ‘Arrow Boys’. The name refers to the minimal amount of weaponry the Arrow Boys have and to similar groups in northern Uganda where the LRA originates. Armed with bows and arrows, spears and ‘fabrications’ (self-made shot guns that are not recognized by the local SPLA troops as arms), the Arrow Boys patrol the dense jungle surrounding their villages. As they have a long history of hunting for bush-meat they are very capable in laying ambushes and following tracks of the LRA. The local population finds that the Arrow Boys “are there at the right time and the right place” and “these boys are our only hope”.

The local Arrow Boys commander, still willing to continue the patrols and sit down for an interview after he has been shot three times in the behind by the LRA, explains. They sometimes stay in the bush for 10 days to hunt down the LRA. The Arrow Boys don’t have many means and lack rubber boots, tents and raincoats. Despite these shortcomings they continue to patrol, something the SPLA hardly does. The commander attributes their ‘hunger’ to hunt down the LRA to their closeness to the families that are brutalized by the LRA. He does not understand why the LRA is here and do the things they do. Is it maybe because they want to wipe out the Zande people? Why else would the LRA concentrate in the border areas where Zande live?

The Arrow Boys have been successful in countering the LRA in the absence of formal security provision. Worries that they would become a rebel group were never validated. The fact that the Zande people are now more secure than in previous years can be largely attributed to the Arrow Boys.

Peace at a national level without local security is not a true peace. But the Arrow Boys show us that local people can protect themselves when they stand together.

Hans Rouw, South Sudan, 19 April 2011.

Hans Rouw works for IKV Pax Christi. IKV Pax Christi works with its partners and allies in areas of conflict on de-escalating and resolving violent conflicts and on building collective security and lasting peace.

IKV Pax Christi is convinced that just and democratic relations and respect for human rights are necessary conditions for achieving lasting peace.

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Last year a 20-year-old woman whose father is from the Zaghawah tribe, and whose mother is from the Birgid, decided to visit her mother. Nothing here to make the headlines, you might say. Unfortunately the Zaghawah and Birgid had been in conflict and, after they finished fighting, the Birgid moved to Shi’airiyah area while the Zaghawah headed for Dar el Salam in northern Darfur. The young woman ended up in the company of her father in Dar el Salam, but her mother was displaced to Shi’airiyah with her clan.

Trouble began when the young woman went to visit her mother in the village of Hagarah, in Shi’airiyah. When she arrived, she was abducted by armed men from the village. They decided she had to pay the sum of 3,000 Sudanese pounds (about $1,200 or £750) to free herself and that, pending payment of ransom, she was to receive five lashes every day until the sum was paid.

When the news reached her father’s tribe, they got ready and mobilised their armed clansmen in Dar el Salam to attack Hagarah. They planned to get the woman back to her father and take 10 women from the other tribe as revenge.

Local mediators, led by Haroon Abdullah Is’hag, saw the danger of violence and intervened, managing to convince the Birgid to apologise for what they had done to the woman, while also convincing the Zaghawah to demobilise. This was done and a solution was reached. Furthermore, it was agreed that inter-tribal family members be granted permission to visit relatives from time to time, with full guarantees that no-one would stand in their way.

A miscarriage caused by passing herders

The Awlad Hamid Bashar, a clan of the Tunjur tribe, were on the move with their animals. Passing by some farms, they camped in order to tidy up their belongings, which were being carried by their animals. During this break, some animals entered a farm of a woman of the Birgid tribe. A conflict erupted between the herders and the woman, who was pregnant at the time, which turned violent. Neighbours intervened, stopping the fighting and taking the woman to hospital. Tragically, however, the woman lost her baby as a result of the violence.

Umdah Ibrahim Busharah, a member of the local Native Administration, set out conditions for the two parties, whereby each was to refrain from trespassing into the other party’s land until the woman had recovered, to prevent any vengeful acts. After the woman had fully recovered, Ibrahim asked the two conflicting parties to meet with a group of mediators from other tribes.

The issue was put to discussion and, many hours later, all agreed that the herders were to pay for the material losses at the farm, as well as the expenses incurred in obtaining medical treatment for the woman. No blood money was prescribed, however, as the two tribes had no precedence for this in the history of conflicts between them.

Not an eye for an eye

In the area of Khazan Jadeed, on the borderline separating south Darfur from north Darfur, a fight broke out between a man from the Is’hag tribe and a young shepherd who worked for him. This resulted in the shepherd losing an eye. The shepherd sent the news to his father, who lived and worked in Libya at the time. The father returned immediately and started mobilising his clan members to fight the Is’hag tribe unless they let him exact personal retribution.

A member of his tribe, Ahmed Abdul Rahman, launched an initiative called ‘quest to reach the cause of the problem first’. He said, “We only heard our son’s story, and we have to hear the other party’s story before deciding.” A delegation of eight members was formed and they went to the Is’hag village, Gad el Haboob.

There they were met by a cousin of the man who had committed the offence. He said that he regretted what had been done by his cousin, and assured them that he would personally cover the expenses of the young shepherd’s medical treatment for a month.

After this month, the delegation returned and was invited by the cousin to sit down with the offender to reach a suitable solution to this problem. The umdahs and sheikhs sat down and finally agreed that the eye is equal to half the human being, and therefore committed the offender to pay half the value of the blood money that would be paid for the loss of a human life. As is the practice in local customary rules, a third of the amount was immediately paid, with the remainder entered into records for future payment.

Conclusion

I have taken examples of life in Darfur that demonstrate the types of conflict that can occur in everyday life, and also the potential for such conflicts to spread without effective interventions. These are real cases, though I have withheld some names to protect the identities of the people.

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