On arrival, I was particularly struck by how little French I actually remembered. While this may seem to be a trivial matter, it was one that grew in significance over the course of the weekend – especially when it transpired that this was to be the language of delivery for our first day of training! Luckily, I had plenty of willing translators on hand and, as each day passed, my linguistic skills improved.

Not too dissimilar to the electoral process in the UK, school buildings serve as the majority of polling centres, with individual classrooms serving as polling stations.

On Saturday 26^th November, we were tasked with ensuring that preparation was underway at the polling centres, checking whether the buildings were secure and if lists of voters had been posted.  On Sunday 27^th November, we took notes detailing whether materials, such as ballot papers and boxes had been delivered to the centres and securely distributed to individual classrooms.

As I spent time observing several voting sites on Monday 28^th November, I was truly inspired by the Congolese people’s enthusiasm and genuine desire for a transparent and truly fair electoral process. Despite the ballot paper amounting to more of a ballot book due to the sheer number of parliamentary candidates, most people voted for both their future president and their parliamentarian of choice.  People took their time to ensure they adhered to the rules of voting, eager to do it properly. Most poignantly, it was apparent that people simply wanted to vote; they wanted their voice to be heard.

As we travelled to various polling stations, it was evident that the majority of voters not only wanted to participate in a fair and open election, but were genuinely grateful for the presence of the international observers.   There were four or five situations where tensions flared between voters, but these were in many ways similar to the aggravation caused by party activists in any typical British election.  On receiving complaints of misconduct, our role was to report such instances through the appropriate channels, and note any patterns or discrepancies.

At the end of the day, votes were counted in each classroom and witnesses for candidates signed in agreement of ballot figures, before these were transported in a sealed bag to the National Results Centre for verification.

While I bore witness to several amateur practices – including loose ballot papers, sloppy admin, and human error in vote counting – overall, the election day itself seemed to be quite successful. The EurAc/AETA Official Report highlights several violent incidents in the Kananga province, and there was clearly intimidation in other areas.  But the vast majority of Congolese did vote peacefully. With determination and high spirits, the majority of the people in the DR Congo tried to do their part to contribute to an effective and reliable democratic electoral process. This should not be discounted or overlooked.

A large part of the international community has responded to the elections with condemnation and frustration.  However, it is vital that criticisms of a few do not negate the sincere efforts and genuine hopes of the many.  My personal experience is that the majority of the Congolese believe in a credible and honest democratic election, and went to great lengths travelling near and far to participate.  A complete dismissal of their efforts risks undermining their faith in democratic values, the very values which the international community has worked hard to support.  It is imperative that global criticisms of corruption of the Congolese few should be met equally with admiration of the Congolese many who have endeavored to participate in the election openly and fairly.   And that the international donors, like the UK and the EU, insist on lessons learned so that the next Congolese elections meet the aspirations of the Congolese people more consistently.

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Taking stock in disarmament process in Matembo, North Kivu. Photo by UN, published under creative commons licence.

As elections begin in DR Congo, we look at one of the issues that continue to plague the country; how to make sure the thousands of militia fighters still active in the east of the country lay down their weapons and reintegrate into communities.

I recently researched Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) projects carried out by the international community in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo, or DRC), looking at activities of the World Bank’s Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). This programme brought together the Congolese Government, various NGOs and UN agencies between 2002 and 2009. I found that although a large number of ex-combatants were successfully demobilized, reintegration was less successful. Furthermore, I found that the majority of DDR projects suffered from a number of shortcomings common to externally led approaches to peacebuilding.

The World Bank’s DDR programme in DRC

The World Bank set up the MDRP in response to the conflict in the Great Lakes region, which has involved seven countries during the 1990s and 2000s. It was arguably the largest DDR program in the world in terms of number of states involved, individuals demobilized and levels of funding (over  $450 million). Although the MDRP as a whole successfully demobilized around 300,000 ex-combatants, the results varied drastically from country to country and project to project. In the DRC, funds were allocated to the following activities:

• The Program National de Desarmement, Demobilisation et Reisertion (PNDDR) – the main DDR programme in the DRC, implemented by the DRC government with technical support from external sources.
• Four Special Projects specifically aimed at child soldiers, implemented by various UN agencies and NGOs.
• Two Special Projects implemented by UNDP.

PNDDR demobilized over 100,000 ex-combatants. However, reintegration efforts were much less successful (only 58% received integration support) and the number of ex-combatants who were successfully reintegrated cannot be determined due to the lack of reliable data. The four Child Soldier Projects provided integration assistance to 12,511 children (61% of target), but only managed to successfully reintegrate 604 children by March 2006, a point in the projects when, according to initial plans, up to 20,000 children should have had been reintegrated. UNDP’s record with regard to DDR provides further cause for concern. Their project, with a budget of $11.8 million, only managed to place 83 ex-combatants out of a target of 10,000 in reintegration projects.

DDR meeting in DRC. Photo by UN, published under creative commons licence.

Explanations for missed targets

While every project had their individual reasons for not meeting their targets and some struggled more than others, there were some common themes which can partly explain the limited overall success of the programme:

1. Although the World Bank designed their initiative with the principle of national ownership in mind, neither the programme nor the Special Projects were locally led. Rather, they were designed, and to a large degree executed, by international actors. This led to a lack of capacity to support DDR activities in remote rural areas.
2. When local implementing partners were involved they often lacked capability and sometimes even commitment; for instance, in the case of PNDDR and the Congolese Government. As the programme’s independent reviewers highlighted, ‘quality of local partners is an under-estimated yet key factor in programme delivery.’ In the case of the DRC, many of these local partners were not sufficiently prepared to undertake the enormous challenge of DDR.
3. A lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities led to huge problems between local and international staff. In PNDDR’s case, international staff were often sidelined and at one point pressured to leave. These tensions between program overseers and implementers meant projects suffered from an institutional preoccupation with internal processes.

The themes described above show that without local knowledge and presence on the ground, many of the challenges posed by building peace in a (post-) conflict society, cannot be overcome successfully. It seems to me that the key to successful peacebuilding lies in identifying reliable and capable local partners and incorporating them into all aspects of programme design and delivery. Putting local peacebuilders in the driving seat will also ensure that there are people who continue to work for peace, long after the convoy of international institutions and nongovernmental organisations has left.

Andre’s research and background paper can be found here.

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To avoid the case of Ivory Coast

On Monday many people feared that the same situation as in Ivory Coast would come to pass in Congo immediately after the elections. “People should learn from the past”, a 70 year old teacher told me yesterday. The scene is gradually being set and all the actors are arranged for a disputed election, or ‘one election with two winners’ as was the case in Ivory Coast.  Yet the wish of the war-weary population, and my wish as a peacebuilder, is to see all the world placing the interests of the population at the centre of our priorities and the peaceful resolution of any disputes arising from the elections.

Voting in DR Congo. Photo by UN, uploaded under a Creative Commons Licence

Violence on polling day

The Congolese people fear that these elections offer an opportunity for secessionist groups to use them as a tool to perpetuate lucrative cycles of violence and war. In Masisi, in Fizi and Lubumbashi armed groups have made themselves heard by attacking polling stations and army positions. It is not known exactly who these groups were, or what their political links may be with local militia on the ground. Combatants held captive in Lubumbashi reportedly say their aim is to ‘free’ the province on Katanga, raising fears that these militants harbour secessionist aims. The wish of the population as a whole is to see these groups returning to reason and putting down their weapons for the higher interest of the population.

Our role as peacebuilders is to sound the alarm so that the international community, international organizations, civil society and any person of good will can bring what pressure they can to bear, and help this young democracy to cut a path towards democratic maturity.

Act to save the electoral process

Peacebuilders across the country think that it is both necessary and possible to act to prevent this country from returning to a situation of violence and war. They say it is not yet too late to save this process, especially while the results are not yet known. They have launched  an urgent call towards the international community to take preventive measures to avoid a resurgence of violence.

Pressure should be exercised on presidential majority parties and opposition parties alike to preach messages of peace, and to embargo their partisans from going down into the streets to cause disorder and violence. Indeed, it is time for all to show their maturity and prove to the world that the DR Congo has institutions of justice that all can trust, and a fair and accountable process to deal with complaints resulting from the elections.

We appeal to all parties to put aside any egoistic dividend and consider first the interests of the Congolese people.

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Flory's organisation, Foundation Chirezi, holds a peace eduation seminar in Kiliba, DR Congo

An excluded minority

Commonly known as ‘Pygmies’, and locally called the ‘twa’, are one of the oldest ethnic groups in DR Congo. Traditionally they live basic lives in the bush, they are seperated from the modern world and they are denied rights. They live without access to healthcare, education and other means of development. Pygmies face discrimination at every level – from the national goverment down to the local population. The lack representation in government, national parliament and even local government.

War between Mupekenya and Mutomboki in Swima

At the beginning of August 2011, an intercommunity war emerged between two groups – the Mupekenya and the Mutomboki – which are drawn from the Pygmie and Bafuliru people respectivly. Tensions began after an attack by the Mupekenya group on the livestock of the Bafuliru people.

After the incident, the Mupekenya fighters attacked the Bafuliru community, raping women and burning their houses. The attacks forceed many Bafuliru to flee.

Now the Bafuliru have allied with Bembe, a neighbouring tribe. The two groups are preparing to launch a joint attack against the Mupekenya and their villages this month.

A minority likely to be massacred

This coalition of local tribes against the Pygmies and the risks a large-scale massacre could cause the extermination of these Pygmies. Exact figures are lacking, but the current local Pygmie population is estimated at between 2,000 to 5,000.

Towards the resolution of this conflict

With the situation in Fizi territory already very fragile, it is pressing that civil society, the government and the international community mobilise for the resolution of the tensions in these communities.

It is with this in mind that our Network of the Peace Builders of Congo (RBPC) wanted to know if it is possible to organise a meeting of tribal leaders to diffuse the conflict. After discussion with members of the community, it was noted that such a meeting would be beneficial to calm the tensions. A small budget was sent already by the network to Peace Direct. However the network thinks that other means are also necessary so that the network and other local and international partners can contribute to resolve this conflict.

Lack of outside attention

With elections fast approaching, and in a zone of high insecurity with attention elsewhere, it is clear that this conflict is not priority for the government. In the same way, the international community, which is allocating all its assistance towards the financing and the monitoring of the elections, is unlikely to shift its focus to this conflict.

It is in this manner that small conflicts are born in Congo, grow and become large enough to extend to the rest of the country.

We can also not ignore the possibility for other groups – like the Mai Mai, FDLR and FNL – could benefit from this occasion to make alliances and influences one or the other side in the area. Adding to the many movements of armed groups which seek alliances and “work” in a country that many do not hesitate any more to describe as a “sick” or “dead-yet-alive”.

In conclusion

For us peacebulders, whose heart is close to the communities, the moment is serious and the time is quickly ticking towards a worsening situation in East Congo. If nothing is done, the situation is likely to return to the starting point of 1996.

While many people and organisations are fixing their eyes on the elections in DR Congo, for the RBPC helping the populations of Swima to solve their current disagreement is an urgency.

An african proverb says, “Don’t rejoice when you see the hut of your neighbours in under fire, yours might be next”.

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The situation has calmed since 2004 and numerous signs of reconciliation can be observed. These include the interaction in market places, joint attendance of school classes and church services, investment in housing construction, denunciation of armed groups’ recruitment attempts, as well as the fact that travelling to places inaccessible during the conflict has become possible again.

Peace is here, but it should be accompanied by reconciliation in order for people to live without fear

Contributions to reconciliation

The approach local organisations seem to take is focused on small-scale projects which might only unfold their full impact in the long run. In contrast, international actors rather seek to act on a large-scale from the beginning, but their longer-term impact is sometimes questioned.

The role of international organisations

Moreover, it enabled social and economic activities to resume. The armed conflict had disrupted interaction between different groups and hence halted the economic flow. Inter-ethnic commercial activities were central to reconciliation in Ituri because the specific roles of the actors in the economic cycle were divided according to ethnic affiliations. Interlocutors agree that MONUC has contributed to building confidence between groups in creating the environment which enabled markets to function again and thus the encounters between different population groups.

The so-called “Security Posts” created by MONUC in Bunia, the capital of Ituri, are an example for this. They allowed people from one ethnic group to go to an area mainly controlled by the other ethnic group. This enabled spontaneous commerce to take off again. Moreover, as pointed out by several local interview partners, the construction of roads by international NGOs was equally essential in the process of reconciliation because people could travel to the markets more easily and therefore different population groups could frequent the same places again.

The contribution of local organisations

international actors act by what they have heard, we act according to what we have seen and lived

Beneficiaries also know that local organisations will stay even after the conflict has ended. This creates trust in their approach as they also have to live with the consequences of their own programmes. International actors, in contrast, often face the financial constraint that “as soon as the budget finishes, the edifice crumbles” (Interview by author, May 2011).

Some interviewees pointed out that international actors might be considered more impartial than local ones. However, what counts is the perception. An example can illustrate this: Internationals were said to have reached out to local actors for information, especially at the beginning of the conflict. In Ituri, it was reported that they often believed what one group told them without considering a potential bias. Therefore, they were not perceived as impartial by the population because they would act according to whatever information they received.

Local people are without any doubt stakeholders in the conflict and can thus almost never be seen as entirely impartial. However, if – for instance – a local organisation dominated by one ethnic group reaches out to different ethnic communities and does not make any distinction of who is involved and who is not in their projects; it can send a very strong signal of impartiality in its programmes.

Cooperation between locals and internationals

Apart from their individual contribution to reconciliation, the even more essential issue is cooperation between local and international organisations. With regard to division of tasks, for instance, the local organisations clearly have their place as intermediaries between internationals and local communities. The internationals, in turn, can serve as linkage between local organisations and the government because often the former do not have the necessary access to state authorities.

In Ituri, this has not always worked smoothly. Locals feel a certain competition for funding with internationals. The latter gain terrain by, for instance, paying per diems (a payment for attending workshops and seminars) to project beneficiaries – something that local organisations cannot afford.

A similar issue is the recruitment of qualified staff perceived as problematic by some local NGOs. International organisations pay higher salaries and can thereby promote a ‘brain drain’ away from the local organisations. One local interviewee said that when it came to funding and meetings with donors, internationals portrayed locals as lacking the necessary competences. He raised the rhetoric question, of how they could build capacities if most of the people they train left to work for internationals afterwards.

Local organisations also shared an impression of internationals only implicating them when they needed information or faced security risks. But, as one observer said, sometimes they did not even want more information because it would prevent them from transplanting a model they know to the context in Ituri.

At the same time, internationals criticised the local organisations expectations. The former feel to be perceived as mere channel of funding and that some local organisations were only created for the sake of getting access to money. A problem was also perceived in the lack of specialisation of local organisations. It was criticized that “they do whatever is asked by the donor community” (Interview by author, May 2011).

The issues of discontent regarding the cooperation between the two should be addressed more openly, instead of swelling underneath the surface. Because in the end, how can reconciliation in Iturian communities, families and individuals credibly be promoted if no (re-)conciliation takes place between international and local peacebuilding organisations?

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Photo credit: United Nations Photo

The history of state predation and neglect in the Congo led to the development of a strong and professionalised civil society in the 1980s. Since 2003 there has been a proliferation of international NGOs working in the eastern region, and a concomitant proliferation of ‘local partners’, oriented towards the international donor regime, leading some to speak of two civil societies. In June 2011 I visited DR Congo to gain more insight into the role of internationals and locals in the DR Congo conflict.

A senior employee of the UN mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO), described the current situation as three separate areas of activity, areas which are intimately related, but which do not actually touch. The security and stabilisation agenda is not affected by the development programming of NGOs, the governance agenda doesn’t take into account the effect of the NGO regime on the state, and the state has neither the capacity, nor the will at all levels, to improve security and stability.

The coordinator of Tuungane – a DfID funded Community Driven Reconstruction programme designed and implemented by the International Rescue Committee – in South Kivu was clear that they could not ‘bring peace by committees’, that participatory development was not a solution for the immediate problem of ‘the rebels in the forest’. At a more fundamental level no ‘development’, political or economic, will succeed unless it takes into account the rebels in the forest as actors in the political economy.

The academic Alex de Waal articulates this as the need for an “inclusive political buy-in”, financed by the biggest buyers in what he terms the “political marketplace” for allegiance, someone who can afford to put enough on the negotiating table in the form of incentives for all those wielding violence as a bargaining chip to get a share.

In DR Congo it is not clear who has the clout to create a stable elite bargain. Each successive agreement since the nominal end of the war in 2002 has excluded key groups, and ignored the hardest to reach. The UN mission is extended year on year, with no exit strategy in sight. International aid organisations may even be the biggest bidders in some localised contexts: the magnet in the job market who no one wants to see leave, providing basic services in the absence of the state. It is this that has led de Waal to decry the tendency for peacebuilding missions to become embroiled in more and more localised manifestations of the conflict, becoming bidders in the marketplace and so distorting the price for allegiance, and making it ever harder for a stable political market to be reached.

On a research trip to South Kivu in June 2011, I visited two Congolese organisations who work on conflict resolution at a local level. Fondation Chirezi (FOCHI) is based in Uvira, while Association de Soutain des Opprimes (ASO) is a partner of Search for Common Ground, both of whom are based in Bukavu. Jason Stearns, in recent interview for Insight on Conflict, spoke of the importance of Congolese civil society for building institutional capacity, transparency and responsiveness in the long term. In very different ways, both FOCHI and ASO are centrally concerned with this relationship between the state and their constituencies.

FOCHI has innovated a system of peace courts, or ‘barazas’. These courts enable conflicts to be resolved within communities rather than taken to the formal justice system which is prohibitively expensive and widely distrusted. With patience and persistence, members of the barazas have dealt with cases that, if not addressed, had the potential to store up resentment and feed into the dynamics of future violence. For example the theft of land from a local woman by an ex-combatant whom the police were afraid to approach. Rather than building a parallel structure, the barazas are in contact with local justices, both to demonstrate an alternative conception of justice as conflict resolution, and to ensure that the baraza system is streamlined with the state system on which it still relies as an ultimate threat point.

FOCHI is also engaged in work related to international organisations working in the area and their constituencies: the people engaged in their projects and the recipients of the basic services they provide. FOCHI follow up on projects that have been completed unsatisfactorily, or require further consideration; in effect building accountability downstream to beneficiaries rather than upstream to donors.

ASO uses forum theatre techniques to address issues of concern in the area, touring plays to villages around Bukavu. Forum theatre, also known as ‘Theatre of the Oppressed’, was developed by Augusto Boal in Brazil. Actors depict instances of injustice, which the audience are then invited to intervene to resolve, either by suggesting how the outcome could be changed or by replacing one of the actors to attempt to do so.

Juvenal Muderhwa, the director, spoke of one case where the clarity given by seeing their own situation played out in front of them led a community to turn to the chief of the locality, who was also in the audience, and demand an end to his economic exploitation of their water and sanitation needs. A week later, Juvenal said, he was called and informed that the chief had stopped levying exorbitant charges on water, and work had begun on three additional wells. Perhaps it is rare that such direct outcomes are observable, yet via the theatrical ‘Forum’, the opportunity for a political forum is created.

All three activities described above work at the interstices of different systems of governance: the practices introduced through participatory development projects – which have international aid organisations as their sovereign powers – the at best paternalistic and at worst predatory state structures, and the forms of violent coercion embodied both by unofficial armed groups and the security sector itself.

While not sufficient on its own to solve the problem of ‘the rebels in the forest’, which remain a regional issue requiring a political solution across borders, it is in building resilient relationships of accountability and responsiveness into these governance mechanisms that a change to the wider political economy may be brought about.

This is a job for the organisations embedded in those local political marketplaces, able to insist upon a stabilisation of the networks of allegiance and sovereignty, with patience and persistence. They do not constitute a distortion of the market, rather they challenge the very manner of its functioning.

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Jason joined us on Skype for an exclusive interview to discuss his new book and the different challenges facing DR Congo today, including the upcoming elections, the role of minerals in the conflict and impunity for crimes committed during the Congolese Wars.

If you wish to download the interview, you can do so by right-clicking on this link and saving the file: Jason Stearns interview

The interview is also available as a podcast (search ‘Insight on Conflict’ on iTunes).

Interview by Ruairi Nolan, June 2011.

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Hope can make all the difference in a person’s life. One small light of hope can lead people to peace, even in the massive shadow of war. SHONA, which means “sew” in Swahili, started with a simple idea; to give dignity and hope to a handful of handicapped persons living in Goma, in the DR Congo who are normally expected to beg for their subsistence. 85% of these craftspeople have never attended school; not even for a day. 60% of them are refugees. Now, instead of being dependent and a burden on their families or charity, they are providing for their families. They are making on average $250 per month in a country where the average income for an able bodied person is only about $15 a month. They are educating themselves, taking courses in French, math and basic accounting, and are using this knowledge to budget their money for future healthcare and emergencies. They are bringing together different minds, from different tribes in peace.

SHONA is a grassroots cooperative. There is no outside funding or support. There are no overhead costs, because there are no paid staff, no offices and no middle men to pay for. Each craftsperson essentially operates their own business—and receives 100% of the profit from their own labour. This is fair trade in the truest sense. It is about empowerment, sustainability and independence in a region where war has claimed many victims. The craftspeople of SHONA refuse to be victims. They will create their own futures with their own hands, and they will pass on their skills by teaching others as they can.

The story of Argentine, a young craftswoman at SHONA speaks volumes of how a little bit of hope can change a person and bring them inner peace. Argentine grew up unable to walk in the heart of war in Eastern Congo. When the fighting began, Argentine’s mother used to carry her on her back into the woods and hide her in a hole until the fighting subsided, sometimes for months at a time. Today, Argentine supports herself and helps to support her family with her own hands. She said of her time at SHONA:

Before I never used to dream. Other people would dream of having a house, or land, but not me. I just hoped that someday something would be better. But now it is different. Now I dream.

Their motto stands tall:
Each item we sew is our claim to a better world.
A world where we are seen
Not only for the challenges we face
But for the beauty we create.
Think Big
Buy Small
Support a Better World

Learn more about Shona in the video below.

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An important question is: whose security interests do these states and international organisations pursue? When looking closer at what security really means to people, it becomes clear that security is first and foremost something personal. When asked what security is, the answers people give are varied, broad, and diverse. To some it is the absence of violence and war, to others it is being able to travel freely or work on their land, and again others include access to schooling and health provision. In general, people define their security in terms of what academics and practitioners refer to as ‘human security’. And the particular aspects of security they prioritise depend on their personal situation. Security is about what security needs are most vital, and what aspects of their security are threatened by their context. Based on how someone defines security needs and interests, and depending on context and position, people determine (consciously or not) their strategies in pursuit of their various security needs. This process can be referred to as the ‘local dynamics of security’.

A process in which people constantly redefine what security is to them, and how they pursue their security needs, means that these local dynamics of security are characterised by a constant struggle between different perspectives on security. Whose definition gains dominance over others? And based on these various definitions, what strategies in pursuit of their security do people deem appropriate?

Definitions and strategies can conflict, as what is security for one person can mean insecurity to another. Having been in the bush for years, where they were part of a social structure and able to obtain food, ex-combatants often find it difficult to reintegrate economically and socially in the civilian community. The social and economic security offered by the armed group falls away, and in their reintegration process they are expected to find different strategies to fulfil their needs. When they fail to find new (legal) strategies, they may opt to return to an armed group or criminal gang. As an ex-combatant in Burundi explained:

I was in the first year of primary school when I went into the militia and now going back to school is difficult. They should help me learn a trade. Now I’m in a situation where I sometimes think I’ll start stealing. Maybe find some friends with guns and form a group to steal.

Such a choice in pursuit of personal security clearly poses a threat to the security of others.

Also, state security actors at the local level are part of these local dynamics of security. In eastern Congo someone explained:

We are concerned with justice, and the police want money. We have no money, and the police are not interested in justice.

Police officers, too, define their own security needs, and strategies to pursue these needs. When their salaries are not paid, for example, they might use opportunities available to them to fulfil their security needs and harass the population for money.

The state security forces can contribute to security only if it adds to security as people on a local level define it. And where state security actors are seen to be oppressing or incapable of security provision, people find alternative ways to provide their security. For instance, in South Sudan where the LRA is attacking the local population, the South Sudanese army (SPLA) is not very active in protecting the civilians. In reaction to this lack of security provision, local chiefs have called on the youth to use their hunting skills and form a vigilante protection force.

To sum up, security is open for interpretation, there is a constant struggle over what is defined as security and what strategies people find appropriate to pursue their security needs. However, taking the local level as a starting point to look at security does not necessarily mean that the local level provides all the answers to the security problems that are encountered. As shown by the above example of an ex-combatant pursuing his personal security needs by re-joining a militia, what is the ‘right’ definition of security, and the ‘right’ strategy in pursuit of it, is in the eye of the beholder. Being involved locally is therefore not a panacea. It does, however, provide a better insight into how these security dynamics develop. And without understanding local security dynamics, how can an intervention bring about a positive change in security?

Also, taking the local level as starting point to look at security does not mean that the impact of national policies and international interventions can be neglected. On the contrary, national, regional and international actors are part and parcel of the local dynamics of security. State practices in security provision may make particular security strategies available, for example by providing a functioning police that acts in favour of local security needs. The state may also limit such strategies, such as when the police work against local interests, or when the state prohibits traditional structures of security provision.

Likewise, international organisations and donor countries can influence local security. This can be through the programmes they implement on the ground, such as by initiating an anti-guns campaign. It can also be through lobbying with the government of a country of intervention, for instance by pushing for security sector reform in diplomatic talks. Thirdly it could be through changes in national policies in the donor country itself, such as regulating the export of weapons.

Clearly, national, regional and international actors play a large role in the dynamics of security. But the effect of outside interventions on local security dynamics is often poorly understood, and this is problematic. Development projects can have unintended side-effects. For instance, rebuilding a few schools after conflict, at first sight sounds like a great project. But what if these schools were only situated in regions where a particular ethnic group lives? Without building new schools elsewhere, rebuilding these schools may risk reinforcing inequalities that gave rise to the conflict in the first place. Also, strengthening police capacity in a post-conflict country seems good, as often the police are ill-trained and poorly equipped. But for instance in Burundi, improving the capacity of security forces can also create security problems for the population, as its government is becoming increasingly authoritarian. An analyst in Sudan criticised such security sector reform interventions by international donors, and complained that such security interventions never have anything to do with democracy: training and equipping soldiers is done, but what does it bring? Shoot people better, kill better, torture better.

International organisations often argue that local actors have ‘capacity problems’. For example, they may lack particular skills in financial management or organisational planning. Therefore international organisations often design and manage projects themselves, and let local organisations implement projects under close supervision. It is true that capacity problems among local actors do exist. On the other hand, there is a capacity problem on the side of international organisations and donors – to truly understand the local context. What impact does a project have on the local security dynamics? How can a project be designed so that its impact is positive? These are questions that need local insights, and hence need local actors.

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ACODIF - Community Action For Integral Development in Fizi

ACODIF is committed to community development, community peacebuilding, poverty eradication in Fizi, DR Congo

By Sango Shila, ACODIF President. 21 December, 2009

The whole of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and in particular the Eastern provinces, lives in a constant state of fear and emergency, due to impunity at a high level. Local people – particularly women, who are subject to widespread human rights abuses – do not know which authorities to rely on.  The world may aspire to peace and stability, but we ask ourselves how peace can become a reality if there is not equal justice for all. Marginalisation and exclusion can not promote a lasting peace.

The situation in East DR Congo has become worse with the arrival of government troops as part of the Kimia II operation to oust the FDLR. Many government troops are not paid and lack discipline. The rape of women and girls is widespread.

Two weeks ago a man was killed in Misisi, a village in the territory of Fizi, by a government soldier. The victim had gone for a ride from Misisi to another village 5 miles away. He was stopped by a soldier who demanded money for cigarettes.

The victim told him he haven’t any money. The soldier got angry and took his bicycle, saying “If you don’t have any money, we’ll take your bike”. A fight broke out, and the soldier took his machine gun and shot the man in the chest, killing the man before fleeing into the bush.

Once the local people were informed, they went in search of the soldier. They destroyed and burned the houses of soldiers in the village, and took machetes, arrows, and spears to fight the government troops.

According to the managing director of Fizi Hospital, 18 people were killed. This demonstrates how easily one incident can quickly escalate to affect a huge number of people.

Upon learning of the situation in Misisi, we in ACODIF, with the help of local authorities, went into the village. By gathering together local leaders from churches, surrounding villages, and the army, in a 4 hour meeting, they were able to bring about a peace agreement to end the violence.

This meeting has allowed the people who had fled to the mountains were free to return to the homes. However, this incident demonstrates the levels of violence that still exist in the region, and how ACODIF has had to negotiate for peace in the absence of control by the government of its troops.

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